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Comment
BORN TO BE USED IN THE USA': AN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUE FOR EVALUATING POLITICIANS' UNAUTHORIZED
USE OF ORIGINAL MUSICAL PERFORMANCES
ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Music is one of the most effective ways to convey a political
message.2 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Democratic can-
didate and future President Bill Clinton played Fleetwood Mac's
tune Don't Stop to emphasize his theme of forward-looking opti-
mism.3 Almost 170 years earlier, supporters of Andrew Jackson
used The Hunters of Kentucky to highlight Jackson's leadership dur-
ing the Battle of New Orleans.4 In the heat of the historic 2008
presidential election, Democrat Barack Obama and Republican
John McCain even incorporated music by the same country duo,
Brooks and Dunn, into their respective campaigns.5 Like Clinton,
Obama, and McCain, most contemporary politicians play original
musical performances (i.e. "already existing" songs) on the cam-
1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, BORN IN THE USA (Columbia Records 1984).
2. See Adam Nagourney, On the Trail; The Edwards Playlist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO3E1D61639F933A157
51C1A9619C8B63 (describing campaign music as having two purposes: energize
crowds and convey political messages); see also Songs Along the Campaign Trail, NA-
TIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=95408459 [hereinafter NPR Interview] (explaining how music has
been used to convey political messages throughout American political history).
3. See Nagourney, supra note 2 (mentioning Bill Clinton's use of Don't Stop
"with its 'Thinking About Tomorrow' chorus").
4. See LYNNE HUDSON PARSONS, THE BIRTH OF MODERN POLITICS: ANDREW JACK-
SON, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE ELECTION OF 1828 160 Oxford University Press
(2009) (describing methods of campaigning during 1828 presidential election).
Thomas Jefferson and Martin Van Buren are other examples of 19th century politi-
cians who used music to convey a campaign message. See NPR Interview, supra
note 2 (discussing use of campaign songs in American political history).
5. See Chris Willman, 'Only in America' Could Obama Borrow the GOP's Favorite
Brooks and Dunn Song, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (Aug. 29, 2008, 10:26 PM), http://
popwatch.ew.com/2008/08/29/only-in-america/ (reporting use of country-duo
Brooks and Dunn's songs by Democratic candidate Barack Obama and Republican
candidate John McCain during 2008 presidential campaign).
(317)
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paign trail rather than having their staffs create songs with a degree
of "personalization." 6
At times, politicians use or reference musical works of artists
who do not support their candidacy.7 A well-known dispute oc-
curred during the 1984 presidential election. At a September cam-
paign stop in musician Bruce Springsteen's native state of New
Jersey, President Ronald Reagan praised Springsteen for the "mes-
sage of hope" in his music. 8 Following Reagan's comments, Spring-
steen strongly disassociated himself from Reagan in a December
1984 cover-story interview for the music-magazine Rolling Stone.9
During the 1996 presidential campaign, the threat of litigation
forced Republican candidate Bob Dole to stop using the hit
Motown song Soul Man at his campaign rallies.10 More recently,
6. See NPR Interview, supra note 2 (explaining most contemporary politicians
play "already existing music" on campaign trail); see also Cat Koo, Ten Songs Stolen by
Politicians, BBC NEWS, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-
arts-11406906 (reporting examples of politicians using original musical perform-
ances both internationally and in U.S.).
7. See Koo, supra note 6 (reporting recent disputes between international po-
litical candidates and musicians that arose from candidates' unauthorized use of
musicians in their campaigns).
8. See Sarah Wheaton, Accompaniments; Theme Songs and Others, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2008), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DO3EFD8153C
F935A25751C0A96E9C8B63 ("Ronald Reagan praised Bruce Springsteen's 'mes-
sage of hope' not long after his dark and critical Born in the U.S.A. came out.").
Reagan said the following:
America's future rests in a thousand dreams .... It rests in the message of
hope in the songs of a man so many young Americans admire- New
Jersey's own Bruce Springsteen. And helping you make those dreams
come true is what this job of mine is all about.
Elizabeth Bird, "Is that Me Baby?" Image, Authenticity, and the Career of Bruce Spring-
steen, 35(2) Am. STUDIES, 39, 44 (1994), available at https://journals.ku.edu/index.
php/amerstud/article/viewFile/2821/2780.
9. See Kurt Loder, The Rolling Stone Interview: Bruce Springsteen, ROLLING STONE,
Dec. 6, 1984, at 21 (expressing Springsteen's opinion that Reagan was "manipu-
lat[ing] and exploit[ing]" people's "need to feel good about the country" by refer-
encing his music). See also Wheaton, supra note 8, ("Mr. Springsteen later implied
in an interview with Rolling Stone that Reagan had exploited people's need to feel
good about the country.").
10. See Dole Campaign Agrees to Change Its Tune, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at 9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/14/us/dole-campaign-agrees-to-
change-its-tune.html (dis-cussing Dole campaign's decision to cease playing Soul
Man). Rondor Music International, Inc. owned the intellectual property rights to
Soul Man and threatened to sue the Dole campaign for copyright infringement.
See id. (discussing potential copyright infringement suit). At Dole's rallies, his cam-
paign played Soul Man, and the song's chorus, "I'm a soul man," often "morphed
into 'I'm a Dole man."' Id. When Rondor Music initially protested Dole's use of
its song, the Dole campaign ceased using the line "I'm a Dole man" and only
played the original song. Id. Shortly thereafter, however, the campaign ceased
using Soul Man altogether. See id. (ceasing use of Soul Man). The line "I'm a Dole
man" was sometimes performed by a member of the Motown duo that originally
[Vol. 18: p. 317
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singer John Mellencamp, who supported Democratic candidate
John Edwards, asked McCain to stop using his songs Our Country
and Pink Houses at his rallies during the 2008 presidential elec-
tion. 1 In response to a letter from Mellencamp's publicist, the Mc-
Cain campaign removed Mellencamp's music from its playlist.12
During that same election, singer Jackson Browne sued McCain af-
ter the McCain campaign used Browne's song Running on Empty in a
campaign advertisement without Browne's permission.'5 Shortly af-
ter the 2010 congressional midterm election season got underway,
former Eagles frontman Don Henley filed suit action against Cali-
fornia assemblyman Charles DeVore for using two of Henley's
songs in his campaign for the 2010 Republican primary for the U.S.
Senate race in California. 14
Because most contemporary politicians prefer to play original
musical performances on the campaign trail, this Comment ex-
plores the legal issues presented when candidates incorporate origi-
nal musical performances into their campaigns without
released Soul Man, Sam Moore of Sam and Dave. See Wheaton, supra note 8 (dis-
cussing Dole's use of Soul Man).
11. See Wheaton, supra note 8 (requesting McCain stop using his songs). Mel-
lencamp also requested that Republican candidate and future President George
Bush stop using his song R.O.C.K in the U.S.A. during the 2000 presidential cam-
paign. See id. (asserting demand for Bush to stop using R.O.C.K in the U.S.A. in
campaign). During that same campaign, Sting and Tom Petty also requested that
Bush cease using their songs Brand New Day and Won't Back Down, respectively. See
id. (noting request by Sting and Petty to President Bush to stop using their songs).
Petty, however, did not protest when Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, whom
he supported, used his song American Girl during her 2008 presidential campaign.
See id. (noting Petty's refraining from protesting when candidate he supported
used his song in political campaign).
12. See Amanda Lee Myers, Mellencamp Songs off McCain's Playlist, Fox NEWS
(Feb. 07, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb07/0,4670,PeopleMc
CainMellencamp,00.html (reporting McCain campaign's decision to no longer
play Mellencamp's songs). The letter read in part, "Are you sure you want to use
[Mellencamp's] music to promote Senator McCain's efforts? Logic says that the
facts might prove to be an embarrassment, were they to be circulated widely." Id.
13. See Complaint 11 19-38, Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (No. 08-05334), 2008 WL 3849451 [hereinafter Browne Complaint] (out-
lining copyright and trademark infringement claims brought by singer Jackson
Browne against presidential candidate John McCain, Republican National Com-
mittee, and Ohio Republican Party for unauthorized use of Browne's song Run-
ning on Empty during 2008 presidential campaign).
14. See Complaint 11 43-76, Henley v. DeVore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 09-0481) [hereinafter Henley Complaint] (outlining copyright
and trademark infringement claims brought by singer Don Henley against senato-
rial candidate Charles DeVore and one of DeVore's campaign directors for their
unauthorized use of Henley's songs during 2010 Republican primary for Califor-
nia's U.S. Senate seat).
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authorization.1 5 Section II of this Comment discusses the basic
principles of copyright and trademark law, First Amendment doc-
trines applicable to political campaigns and intellectual property
law, and recent cases involving the unauthorized use of intellectual
property in political campaigns.16 Section III begins by evaluating
the impact that the cases discussed in Section II will have on future
litigations involving the unauthorized use of an original musical
performance in a political campaign.1 7 Because of that impact, Sec-
tion III then proposes that courts apply a modified alternative ave-
nues test to make preliminary determinations of copyright fair use
in cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical per-
formance in a political campaign.18 The Comment concludes in
Section IV that politicians will likely litigate challenges to their use
of original musical performances well past the conclusion of their
campaigns, and accordingly, it is in the interest of justice for courts
to apply the modified alternative avenues test proposed herein.19
15. See NPR Interview, supra note 2 (explaining that most modern politicians
use original musical performances as campaign songs).
16. In particular, this Comment focuses on Ninth and Second Circuit prece-
dent because most entertainment-related intellectual property cases are filed in
those circuits, including Browne v. McCain and Henley v. DeVore. See William K.
Ford, judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (2006) ("Only
two circuits, the Second and the Ninth, plausibly possess sufficient experience with
copyright litigation to acquire substantially greater expertise relative to the other
circuits."); Browne Complaint, supra note 13 (filed within Ninth Circuit); Henley Com-
plaint, supra note 14 (filed within Ninth Circuit); see also, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC,
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1992); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Na-
der, No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004); Allen v. Nat'l
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Other circuits have also handled
celebrity intellectual property disputes. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d
437 (6th Cir. 2003); Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986); Carson v.
Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
17. For a further discussion of the impact of recent cases that is discussed in
Section III, see infra notes 258-97 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the modified alternative avenues test proposed
in this Comment, see infra notes 298-345 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of this Comment's conclusion, see infra notes
346-51 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: p. 317
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss1/7
BORN TO BE USED IN THE USA
II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Law
1. Copyright Ownership Rights
A copyright is a form of property ownership. 20 Copyrights
grant individuals the exclusive right to use and disseminate their
creative works for a fixed number of years. 21 The principle of copy-
right protection originated in Britain's 1710 Statute of Anne as a
response to the invention of the printing press.22 In the United
States, the Constitutions Copyright clause grants Congress the enu-
merated power is to protect copyrights.23 The current law gov-
erning copyright protections is the Copyright Act of 1976 (the
"Copyright Act").24
To be eligible for copyright protection, a work must be (1)
original and (2) "fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which [it] can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated." 23 The Copyright Act limits
copyright ownership to "those aspects of the work-termed 'expres-
sion'-that display the stamp of the author's originality."26 Accord-
20. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Like other forms of
property ownership, copyright ownership is a 'bundle of discrete rights' regarding
the owner's ability to use his property.").
21. Copyright Basics, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 1-2 (2008), http://
www.copy-right.gov/circs/circl.pdf (explaining basic concepts and importance of
copyrights).
22. See Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710), available at http://www.case.
edu/affil/sce-/authorship/statueofanne.pdf (enacting first copyright code). The
Statue of Anne was enacted because the invention of the printing press resulted in
the widespread unauthorized reprinting of books and other writings in England.
See Id. (discussing purpose of enactment); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 n.12 (1984) ("Copyright protection became
necessary with the invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings in
the British censorship laws."). Historically, copyright law "served to protect copy-
right interests when the publisher lost the physical control over the copies," and
"[m]ass distribution of works required a substitute for contractual or physical re-
straints over the use." Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 275
(1996) (comparing historical purposes of copyright law to modem applications in
cyberspace.
23. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
24. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (LexisNexis 2010) (setting forth exclusive rights held
by copyright holders).
25. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a). "Copyright protection subsists from the time the
work is created in fixed form." Copyright Basics, supra note 21, at 2.
26. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(explaining scope of copyright ownership).
2011] 321
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ingly, ideas, facts, principles, and concepts cannot be copyrighted.27
Items that can be copyrighted include literary works, musical works,
and sound recordings.28 In general, the duration of copyrights for
works created after 1978 is the life of the author or artist plus sev-
enty years.29 After its copyright protection expires, a work becomes
part of the "public domain," and the public may use the previously-
copyrighted work without restriction.30
Under the Copyright Act, copyright holders have the exclusive
right to reproduce, publicly perform, publicly display, and create
derivatives of their copyrighted works.31 To succeed in a copyright
infringement action, a plaintiff must prove "(1) ownership of a
valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original."32 The standard for determining copying is
"'substantial similarity' between the copyrighted work and the alleg-
edly infringing work."33
27. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); see abo
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 ("In addition, no author may copyright facts or
ideas.").
28. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (1)-(8) (listing examples of works of authorship
protected by Copyright Act).
29. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 302 (codifying duration of copyright ownership); see also
Copyright Basics, supra note 21, at 5-6 (explaining duration of copyright rules).
30. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir.
2001) ("The second goal of the Copyright Clause is to ensure that works enter the
public domain after an author's rights, exclusive, but limited, have expired."); El-
dred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003) ("A work in the public domain is, by definition, without a
copyright."); see also BLACK's LAw DicaIONARY 1349 (9th ed. 2009) (defining public
domain as "[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to use with-
out charge").
31. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (setting forth exclusive rights held by copyright
holders).
32. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir.
1997) ("To prove a case of copyright infringement, [the plaintiff] must prove both
ownership of a valid copyright and infringement of that copyright by invasion of
one of the five exclusive rights."). The owner of a copyright is not required to
register the copyright for the work to be protected. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 408(a)
("[Copyright] registration is not a condition of copyright protection."). However,
in order to bring an infringement suit for works of U.S. origin, the author must
first register the copyright with the United States Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C.S.
§ 411(a) ("[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made in accordance with this title.").
33. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398 (explaining standard for copyright in-
fringement). "'Substantial similarity' refers to similarity of expression, not merely
similarity of ideas or concepts." Id.
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss1/7
BORN TO BE USED IN THE USA
2. Fair Use Defense
Fair use is an affirmative defense available when, without au-
thorization, a party appropriates a copyrighted work for limited
purposes such as "comment," "news reporting," and "teaching."34
It is an "exception to a copyright holder's right to exclusive use of
the original work and its derivatives."35 Accordingly, fair use is a
"privilege" that allows others to use copyrighted material without
the copyright holder's permission.3 6 As with any affirmative de-
fense, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate fair use.3 7
The fair use defense balances artists' interests in protecting
their creative works against the public's interests in protecting free
speech and the free dissemination of ideas.3 8 It also enables creativ-
34. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (codifying fair use defense); Soc'y of Holy Transfig-
uration Monastery v. Gregory, 685 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226 (D. Mass. 2010) (explain-
ing fair use is affirmative defense). Prior to its codification in the 1976 Copyright
Act, the fair use defense evolved at common law. See William Henslee, You Can't
Always Get What You Want, But If You Try Sometimes You Can Steal It and Call it Fair
Use: A Proposal to Abolish The Fair Use Defense For Music, 58 CATH. U.L. REV. 663, 666-
76 (2009) (explaining origin of fair use defense); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (tracing common law development of fair
use defense). The codification of the fair use defense in the 1976 Copyright Act
was intended to "restate" the common law doctrine that developed, "not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975)).
35. Henley v. DeVore, No. 09-0481, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. June 10, 2010) (explaining standards for fair use).
36. Id. ("[Fair use] has been described as 'a privilege in others than the owner
of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent."' (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 549 (1985))).
37. See id. at *11 (explaining allocation of burden of proof when fair use de-
fense is asserted); Gregory, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (Same); MasterCard Int'l Inc. v.
Nader, No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at*35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004)
(Same).
38. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (noting fair use requires "sensitive balancing
of interests"); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148,
1151-52 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Courts balance these factors to determine whether the
public interest in the free flow of information outweighs the copyright holder's
interest in exclusive control over the work." (citing DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fan-
tasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982))); Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v.
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978) (stating fair use
involves weighing "the exclusive right of a copyright holder" against "the public's
interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern," and
"[c] onflicts between interests protected by the First Amendment and the copyright
laws can be resolved by application of the fair use doctrine" (citing Wainwright
Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977))). The fair use
doctrine can also be considered to be a "free speech catch-all" for copyright law.
See Eileen Hintz Rumfelt, Comment, Political Speech: Priceless- MasterCard v. Nader
and the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 55 EMoRy L.J. 389, 397-98
(2006) ("[T]he fair use doctrine often functions as a free speech 'catch all.'"). For
a further discussion of the First Amendment's impact on copyright law, see infra
notes 159-75 and accompanying text.
2011] 323
7
Cursio: Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative Avenue for Evaluating
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
324 VILIANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW jOURNAL
ity by allowing artists and authors to borrow from others when nec-
essary and appropriate.39 The Copyright Act sets forth the
following factors for courts to weigh when analyzing fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.40
Courts must evaluate fair use on a case-by-case basis.41 The fair
use doctrine is an "equitable rule of reason," and there is no "gen-
erally applicable definition" of fair use that allows for a rigid stan-
dard of evaluation.42 Courts must ensure that the fair use defense
does not stifle creativity, which Congress intended it to encourage,
while simultaneously protecting copyright holders' intellectual
property rights. 43 The "ultimate test" of fair use is to determine
39. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 ("[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in
art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly
new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows,
and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used
before." (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass.
1845))).
40. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107(1)-(4) (setting forth factors to consider when analyz-
ing fair use).
41. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("The task [of determining fair use] is not to
be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis."); see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir.
2006) ("As the words of [the Copyright Act] indicate, the determination of fair use
is an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry."); Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67987, at *10-11 ("The factors are not winner-take-all categories to be tallied at the
end to determine the prevailing party; they are intended to be carefully weighed
case by case with an eye towards the policies underlying copyright protection.").
But see William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake ofEldred, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1659 (2004) ("[W]hereas the fair use defense
is interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis, though some rules have
emerged, as we have seen, such as the right of a book reviewer to quote brief
passages from the book under review, or of scholarly critics to quote from the work
they are criticizing.").
42. Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1151 n.4 (reviewing legislative history of fair
use factors set forth in Copyright Act (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 65-66)).
43. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("The fair use doctrine thus permits and
requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occa-
sion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." (quot-
ing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
[Vol. 18: p. 317
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whether allowing the disputed use would serve copyright law's goal
of "promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts" better than
prohibiting the use would.4 4 The scope of the fair use defense is
also "wider when the use relates to issues of public concern."4 5
Therefore, the four fair use factors set forth in the Copyright Act
are not exclusive; courts may also consider other factors when de-
termining fair use.46
The issue of fair use presents a mixed question of law and fact,
which allows courts to make fair use determinations on summary
judgment.4 7 The "most important question under the first [fair
use] factor, and in fair use analysis generally," is whether the secon-
dary work is "transformative."4 8 However, it is "not absolutely nec-
essary" that a secondary work be transformative for a finding of fair
The Court explained that a fair use analysis must be conducted by weighing all
four statutory factors together "in light of the purposes of copyright." See id. (ex-
plaining proper way to analyze fair use questions).
44. See MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3644, at*35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) ("The ultimate test of fair use, therefore, is
whether the copyright law's goal of 'promoting the Progress of Science and useful
Arts' . . . would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it." (citing
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d
Cir. 1992))).
45. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th
Cir. 1994) (explaining fair use protected defendant's right to use document at
issue "to comment on public issues and to petition the government regarding legis-
lation" (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1050 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984))). But see Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1985) (refusing to create
copyright infringement exception based on "substantial public import" of copy-
righted material).
46. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (stating "factors to be considered shall include"); see
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547, 560-61
(1985) (explaining four statutory fair use factors are "are not meant to be exclu-
sive" but are "especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair"). Like-
wise, the examples of fair use in the section's preamble are not all-inclusive. See
Campbell 510 U.S. at 577-78 ("The text employs the terms 'including' and 'such as'
in the preamble paragraph to indicate the 'illustrative and not limitative' function
of the examples given . . . ." (quoting Harper &' Row, 471 U.S. at 561)).
47. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining fair use
is mixed question of fact and law appropriate for summary judgment); see also Hen-
ley v. DeVore, No. 09-0481, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 10,
2010) (explaining "summary judgment on the fair use question is proper" when
there are no material facts in dispute).
48. Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 at *37-38 (explaining importance of
determining transformative nature of secondary work in fair use analysis (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))); see also Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007) (opining first fair
use factor's "central purpose" is to "determine whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative.'").
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use.49 A transformative work "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expres-
sion, meaning or message."5 0 It is possible, however, for a secon-
dary work that uses an exact copy of the original work to be
transformative. 51
If a secondary work is a parody of an original work, the secon-
dary work is viewed as transformative.5 2 "Parody is the use of some
portion of a work in order to 'hold it up to ridicule,' or otherwise
comment or shed light on it."63 The threshold question for deter-
mining fair-use parody is whether parody can "reasonably be per-
ceived" in the secondary work.5 4 For a court to find fair-use parody
in a secondary work, commentary on the original work should have
been intended when the secondary work was created; it should not
be a "post hoc rationalization [ I]" used to defend against a copyright
infringement suit.5 5 Furthermore, parody differs from satire- par-
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (explaining importance of transformative use
when analyzing first fair use factor).
50. Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *38 (discussing requirements for
secondary work to be transformative (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579)). If a
secondary work "'merely supersedes' the original," it is not transformative. See id.
(defining transformative).
51. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (holding internet search engine
Google added "new context to serve a different purpose" by enabling internet
users to access third party websites posting infringing images of Perfect 10's nude
models (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2003)));
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-253 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding incorporating ex-
act copy of original work into collage was transformative because of "sharply differ-
ent objectives" of original work and collage); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp.,
235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding newspapers' republication of copy-
righted modeling portfolio photos to be transformative because photos were pub-
lished "in conjunction with editorial commentary"); Lennon v. Premise Media, 556
F. Supp. 2d 310, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding movie's use of unaltered clip of
Beatle's song Imagine was transformative because it criticized and commented by
"contribut[ing] to the broader public interest by stimulating debate on an issue of
current political concern").
52. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (explaining "parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value").
53. Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *13 (defining parody (quoting Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400-01 (9th Cir.
1997))); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (defining parody as "the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author's works.").
54. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 ("The threshold question when fair use is
raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be
perceived.").
55. Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *26 (holding that "the parodist's
subjective contemporaneous intent in making the work is relevant to the parody
inquiry" (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 600 (Kennedy, A., concurring); Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183-84 (2d
Cir. 1981); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1986); Bourne Co. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
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ody "target[s]" the copyrighted work whereas satire uses the copy-
righted work as "a vehicle to poke fun at another target."56
Accordingly, parody presents a strong case for fair use, but satire
does not.5 7 Additionally, courts are split as to whether the use of
copyrighted material to criticize the creator, rather than the work
itself, constitutes fair-use parody.58
A finding of fair-use parody under the first fair use factor af-
fects how a court evaluates the subsequent factors. Courts give very
little weight to the second and third factors when the secondary
work is parody.59 Courts, however, require more weight to be given
to the second and third factors when there is a "loose" fit between
the parody and the original work; such as when the secondary work
doesn't directly target the original work.60 The relevant inquiry for
the fourth fair use factor is "whether the new work tends to sup-
plant or substitute for the potential market for the original or its
derivatives."61 However, market harm to an original work solely
56. Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *14 (distinguishing between satire
and parody (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1400)).
57. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 ("Parody needs to mimic an original to
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collec-
tive victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so re-
quires justification for the very act of borrowing."); see also Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67987, at *34 ("However, as noted in Campbell, satire faces a higher bar for
fair use because it requires greater justification for appropriating the original
work.").
58. See, e.g., Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *22 ("Under Campbell's
reasoning, rather than its precise phrasing, criticism of the author via the author's
works may fit within the structure of protectable parody."); Salinger v. Colting, 641
F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2010) ("Campbell and its progeny define the limits of parody to include only those
elements which criticize or comment upon the source author's works, rather than
the author himself."). Secondary works that parody the creator "must target the
author directly" rather than targeting the "author's views generally for the works to
qualify as fair use. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *31 (explaining
standard for "parody-of-the-author" fair use).
59. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *44-48 (explaining second and
third factors are not as significant in fair use analysis when disputed work is deter-
mined parody (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol
Publ'g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998); Liebowitz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998))). To be an effective parody, a secondary
work must use enough of the original work "to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable," which thereby makes the third factor less important after the court
determines that the secondary work is a parody. Id. at *47-48 (quoting Campbell,
510 U.S. at 588).
60. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *15 ("The 'loose' parodist has a
greater burden of proving the necessity of the use and that the parody does not
risk superseding potential markets for the original." (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at
580 n.14, 582 n.16.)).
61. Id. at *12 (explaining standards for fair use factors).
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due to the parodic nature of a secondary work does not weigh in
favor of the copyright holder.62
In MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc.,63
the District Court for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.)
addressed the fair use defense in the context of a political cam-
paign.64 In the heat of the 2000 presidential campaign, MasterCard
filed suit against the campaign of 'independent presidential candi-
date Ralph Nader, which modeled one of its political advertise-
ments after MasterCard's famous "Priceless" advertisements (the
"MasterCard Advertisements"). 65 The Nader campaign's advertise-
ment mimicked the well-known MasterCard Advertisements by list-
ing items synonymous with dirty politics, the "prices" for each item,
and then stating at the conclusion: "Finding out the truth: priceless.
There are some things money can't buy" (the "Nader Advertise-
ment").66 One of MasterCard's causes of action was copyright in-
fringement. 67 On summary judgment, the court held that the
Nader Advertisement was a fair-use parody of the MasterCard
Advertisements. 68
62. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *48 ("[I]f the secondary work
harms the market for the original through criticism or parody, rather than by of-
fering a market substitute for the original that supersedes it, it does not produce a
harm cognizable under the Copyright Act." (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592); see
also Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *12-13 ("Harm caused by effective
criticism or disparagement is not cognizable under the Copyright Act"). When
analyzing the fourth fair use factor, courts must also consider "whether un-
restricted and widespread conduct" similar to that of the defendant would harm
the market for the plaintiffs original work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (explain-
ing standard for evaluating fourth fair use factor). Furthermore, courts must also
consider whether the defendant's conduct will harm the market for derivative
works of the original. See id. (analyzing defendant's conduct).
63. No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
64. See id. at *1-2 (describing nature of dispute).
65. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *2 (reviewing origin of dispute).
The MasterCard Advertisements "feature [d] the name and images of several goods
and services purchased by individuals which, with voice-overs and visual displays,
convey to the viewer the price of each item." Id. at *2 (describing MasterCard
Advertisement). At the conclusion of the MasterCard Advertisements, a "priceless
intangible" is mentioned followed by the voice-over saying "Priceless. There are
some things that money can't buy, for everything else, there is MasterCard." Id.
66. Id. at *2-3 (describing Nader campaign's alteration of MasterCard Adver-
tisements). The Nader Advertisement aired on television for a total of eleven days
and was posted on Nader's website throughout the campaign. See id. at *3
(describing airing of Nader Advertisement).
67. See id. at *3 (stating MasterCard's copyright infringement claims). Master-
Card also brought three claims for trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, which will be discussed later in this Section.
68. See id. at *49 (dismissing MasterCard's copyright infringement claim).
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The court held that the first and fourth fair use factors heavily
favored the Nader campaign.6 9 The court reasoned that the Nader
Advertisement was a parody and, thus, transformative; the Nader
Advertisement conveyed a different message, one that commented
on the "materialistic message" that was "sugar coated" in the Mas-
terCard Advertisements.7 0 Because parody in a secondary work
need only "reasonably be perceived," the court held that the Nader
Advertisement was "sufficiently a parody for the purposes of a fair
use analysis."71 In its analysis of the fourth fair use factor, the court
acknowledged that the two advertisements served the "general over-
lapping market" of the "viewing public."72 However, the court held
that the fourth factor strongly favored fair use because the Nader
Advertisement served a political purpose that was entirely different
than the commercial purpose of the MasterCard Advertisements. 73
Because the court viewed the Nader Advertisement as parody,
it afforded the second and third factors little significance in its fair
use analysis.74 Accordingly, weighing all four fair use factors, the
court held that the Nader Advertisement constituted fair use of
MasterCard's copyright.75
B. Trademark Law
1. Trademark Ownership
A trademark is a "word, name, symbol, or device, or any combi-
nation thereof' that is used to identify and distinguish one's prod-
uct or goods from those of another.76 In general, trademarks
69. See id. at *4243, 48-49 (holding first and fourth fair use factors favored
Nader campaign).
70. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *42-43. The message of the
Nader Advertisement was that presidential candidates can be bought in many ways,
but the he stood for the truth. See id. (analyzing Nader's advertisement). The mes-
sage of the MasterCard Advertisements was that consumers could use their Master-
Card to purchase everything but intangible "priceless" items. See id. at *42. (noting
MasterCard statements). The court agreed with the Nader campaign's assertion
that the Nader Advertisement "wittingly comment[ed] on the craft of the original,
'which cloak[ed] its materialistic message in warm, sugar-coated imagery that pur-
port[ed] to elevate intangible values over the monetary values it in fact
hawk[ed].'" Id. at *43.
71. Id. at *43 ("The message [of a parody] need not be popular nor agreed
with. It may be subtle rather than obvious. It need only be reasonably
perceived.").
72. Id. at *49.
73. See id. (comparing political and commercial purposes).
74. See id. at *44-48 (evaluating second and third fair use factors).
75. Id. at *49 (granting Nader campaign summary judgment on MasterCard's
copyright claim).
76. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (LexisNexis 2010).
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perform four functions.77 First, trademarks identify and distinguish
the trademark holder's goods.78 Second, trademarks indicate that
"all the goods bearing the mark derive from the same source."79
Third, trademarks signify to consumers that "all goods bearing the
mark are of the same quality."80 Finally, trademarks serve as a pri-
mary instrument "in the advertisement and sale of the seller's
goods."81 The Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect
trademark ownership rights "because trademarks foster competi-
tion and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer
the benefits of good reputation."82 Therefore, trademark owner-
ship rights protect producers against lost sales due to consumer
confusion regarding the origin of products in the market.83
Federal trademark rights are governed by the Lanham Act.84
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to "foster fair competition," pre-
vent the deceit of consumers, and protect the mark holder's good-
will in the marketplace.85 For a mark to be protected under the
Lanham Act, the public must be able to (1) recognize the mark as
identifying the goods or services with which the mark is associated
and (2) distinguish those goods and services through the mark.86
To qualify as serving those functions, a mark must be "inherently
distinctive" or acquire "secondary meaning."87 Secondary meaning
77. See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343
F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2003) (providing functions of trademark protections); see
also Indianapolis Colts v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, No. IP. 94-727-C,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19277, at *8-9 (S.D. Ind. June 27, 1994) (Same).
78. See State Auto Prop., 343 F.3d at 257 (noting trademarks identify and distin-
guish goods).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (looking at use of trademarks in advertisements).
82. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (quoting Park' N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
83. Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir.
2008) (stating lost sales can be harm suffered because of trademark infringement).
84. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1051-1141 (LexisNexis 2010) (codifying trade-
mark protections).
85. See Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, Comment, A Celebrity Balancing Act: An
Analysis of Trademark Protection under the Lanham Act and the First Amendment Artistic
Expression Defense, 99 Nw. U. L. REv 1817, 1823 n.38 (2005) (explaining Supreme
Court interpretation and congressional intent of Lanham Act); see also Rumfelt,
supra note 38, at 392 (discussing purposes of trademark law).
86. See Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th
Cir. 2000) (explaining requirements for trademark recognition).
87. See id.(describing attributes of mark needed to qualify for protection); see
also Arrow Fastener Co. v. The Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Whether the mark is entitled to protection depends on whether it is inherently
distinctive or, if merely descriptive, has acquired 'secondary meaning.'" (citing
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attaches when the mark and the product or business the mark sym-
bolizes "become synonymous in the mind of the public, submerg-
ing the primary meaning of the [mark] in favor of its meaning as a
word identifying that [product or] business."88 The Act also estab-
lishes trademark law's "functionality doctrine," which precludes
trademark ownership for a "useful product feature."89 Further-
more, trademark law specifies that a trademark right only attaches
if the owner was the first to use that mark in commerce.90
Marks are generally grouped into four categories: fanciful or
arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, or generic.91 Fanciful, arbitrary,
and suggestive marks function as trademarks "almost automati-
cally."92 A descriptive mark can only function as a trademark if the
mark has acquired secondary meaning.93 A "generic term can
never be a valid trademark."9 4 The Lanham Act's definition of
Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995))).
88. Arrow, 59 F.3d at 390.
89. Qualitex Co. vJacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (explaining
"[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark law," to grant "a monopoly over
new product designs or functions for a limited time").
90. See Dep't of Parks & Rec. v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1125
(9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that common law "requires a mark to have been used
in commerce before a protectable ownership interest in the mark arises"). "To
acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented the mark first
or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must have been the
first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services." Id. (citation omitted).
91. See Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ. Co., 173 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999)
("There are four categories along the spectrum of possible trademarks: generic,
descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful."). These categories are also used
to determine the strength of a trademark in a likelihood of confusion analysis. See
id. (analyzing strength of trademark). For a further discussion of the likelihood of
confusion analysis for trademark infringement cases, see infra notes 104-09 and
accompanying text.
92. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162 (-"[F]anciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive'
words or designs . .. almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand
(citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir.
1976); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992))); see also
Arrow, 59 F.3d at 391 ("Suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful marks may be protected
without a showing of secondary meaning."). "A fanciful mark is a made-up term."
Arrow, 59 F.3d at 391. "An arbitrary mark has an actual dictionary meaning, but
that meaning does not describe the product." Id. "A suggestive mark offers sug-
gestions of, but does not actually describe, the features of a product." Id.
93. See Arrow, 59 F.3d at 391 (explaining general characteristics of protected
trademarks).
94. Id.; see also Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9.
[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has
achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name.
Id.
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trademark, however, when "read literally, is not restrictive." 95 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a color can function as
a trademark.9 6
Trademark ownership lasts as long as the trademark is in con-
tinuous use.97 A Trademark will lose legal protection if it no longer
"relate [s] exclusively to the trademark owner's product."98 Like-
wise, a mark no longer used by its owner is considered "abandoned"
and, therefore, loses legal protection and becomes available for
public use.99
2. Liability under the Lanham Act
To succeed on a claim for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) trademark ownership and
(2) that the defendant's unauthorized use of the trademark is likely
to cause consumer confusion.100 The Lanham Act protects both
registered and unregistered trademark holders against misappro-
priation of their protected marks.101 Though not required for
95. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. "Since human beings might use as a 'symbol' or
'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language,
read literally, is not restrictive."
96. See id. at 163, 174 (holding color that acquired secondary meaning meets
legal requirements for trademark protection). The Court also listed shapes,
sounds and scents as examples of seemingly generic marks that may function as
protected trademarks. See id. at 162. (setting forth qualifying marks).
97. See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("[Wlhile trademarks endure as long as the mark is used, copyrights eventu-
ally expire."). This indefinite ownership should not be confused with the Lanham
Act's registration requirements, which allow registration for ten-year renewable in-
crements with certain interim requirements. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1058 (LexisNexis
2010) (setting forth registration requirements).
98. Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC, 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996). Trademarks lose
protection because "the primary cost of recognizing property rights in trademarks
is the removal of words from (or perhaps non-entrance into) our language." Id.
99. See Abdul-fabbar, 85 F.3d at 411 ("[T]he law ceases to protect the owner of
an abandoned mark"); see also 15 U.S.C.S § 1127 (LexisNexis 2010) (setting forth
standard that mark that becomes generic is considered to be "abandoned").
Under the Lanham Act, a mark is abandoned when the owner intends to discon-
tinue its use; three consecutive years of non-use is "prime facie evidence of aban-
donment." See 15 U.S.C.S § 1127 (2009) (defining "abandoned").
100. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114 (LexisNexis 2010) (setting forth cause of action
and remedies for trademark infringement of registered trademarks); see also Com-
edy III Prods. Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In
order to prevail on a Lanham Act claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a
trademark and the subsequent use of that mark by another in a manner likely to
create consumer confusion."); Arrow, 59 F.3d at 390 (explaining elements of Lan-
ham Act claim). Those two elements of a Lanham Act claim are known as the
"validity" and "infringement" prongs. See Comedy III, 200 F.3d at 594 (noting two
prongs of Lanham Act).
101. See Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ. Co., 173 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1999)
(explaining 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) - Section 32(1) - prohibits misappropriation of
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trademark ownership rights, registration of a mark serves as prime
facie evidence of trademark ownership.102 A defendant, however,
may rebut that "presumption of ownership with evidence establish-
ing its own prior use in commerce of the registered mark."103
The second element of a Lanham Act claim requires courts to
undertake a "likelihood of confusion" analysis.104 Courts must de-
termine whether "numerous ordinary prudent purchasers are likely
to be misled or confused as to the source of the product in question
because of the entrance in the marketplace of defendant's
mark."105 To evaluate likelihood of confusion, the Circuit Courts
have developed various tests. The Second Circuit applies the fol-
lowing eight factors, which are known as the Polaroid factors:
(1) strength of the mark;
(2) degree of similarity between the two marks;
(3) proximity of the products;
(4) likelihood that the trademark holder will "bridge the
gap" (i.e. likelihood that trademark holder will enter into
the market of the alleged infringer);
(5) actual confusion;
(6) defendant's good faith in adopting the mark;
(7) quality of the defendants' product; and
registered trademarks and § 1125(a) (1) - Section 43(a) - prohibits misappropria-
tion of unregistered trademarks). Trademarks are registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051 (a) (1) ("The owner of
a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the
principal register hereby established by paying the prescribed fee and filing in the
Patent and Trademark Office . . . .").
102. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1057(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register pro-
vided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or ser-
vices specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations
stated in the certificate.
Id.; 15 U.S.C.S. § 1115(a) (establishing evidentiary standard that registration is
prime facie evidence of trademark validity and ownership); see also Dep't of Parks
& Rec. v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining
registration of trademark is prime facie evidence of trademark ownership).
103. See Bazaar Del Mundo, 448 F.3d at 1124.
104. See Arrow, 59 F.3d at 390-91 (explaining likelihood of confusion analysis).
105. Id.
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(8) sophistication of the buyers.106
The Ninth Circuit's applies a similar set of factors to determine
likelihood of confusion, known as the Sleekcraft factors.107 Other
circuits have also adopted similar multi-prong evaluations to ana-
lyze likelihood of confusion. 108 These factors, however, are not ex-
clusive, and "[o]ther variables may come into play depending on
the particular facts presented."109
Liability under the Lanham Act is not limited to the misappro-
priation of a trademark in commercial activities. Though the statu-
tory language of the Lanham Act only imposes liability for the
unauthorized use of a trademark "in commerce," that phrase is sim-
ply a description of federal courts' jurisdiction over acts that Con-
gress may regulate pursuant to the Constitution's Commerce
Clause. 110 Furthermore, the Lanham Act also may apply to unau-
106. Id. at 391 ("Under the law of this Circuit, courts deciding whether a
plaintiff has established likelihood of confusion must consider the eight factors
elaborated by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp .... ); see also
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) (establishing Second Circuit likelihood of confusion
factors).
107. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)
(listing likelihood of confusion factors). The Sleekeraft factors are as follows:
(1) strength of the mark;
(2) proximity of the goods;
(3) similarity of the marks;
(4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) marketing channels used;
(6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser;
(7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark;
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Id.; see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P, 109 F.3d at 1404 ("The eight-factor Sleekcraft test is
used in the Ninth Circuit to analyze the likelihood of confusion question in all
trademark infringement cases, both competitive and non-competitive.").
108. The First Circuit's likelihood of confusion factors are known as the
Pignons factors. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657
F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981) (setting forth Pignons factors). The Sixth Circuit
adopted the Sleekcraft Factors. See Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steuben-
ville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.1982) (adopting Sleekcraft Factors). The Eight
Circuit's likelihood of confusion factors are known as the SquirtCo factors. See Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying the
Eight Circuit's SquirtCo factors (citing SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091 (8th Cir. 1980))).
109. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348 n.11.
110. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc. 128
F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The history and text of the Lanham Act show that 'use
in commerce' reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking
uses of a trademark."); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694
(N.D. Ohio 2002) ("Put simply, the 'commercial and in commerce' provision con-
tained in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) 'denotes Congress's authority under the Com-
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thorized uses of trademarks in political speech." 1 Courts view the
intentional confusion of the electorate regarding the source of po-
litical material to be very dangerous to the political process. 12
merce Clause, rather than an intent to limit the Lanham Act's application to
profitmaking activity."' (quoting United We Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 92-93)); see also
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-0629, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3338, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997) ("The 'use in commerce' require-
ment of the Lanham Act is a jurisdictional predicate to any law passed by Con-
gress"). The Supreme Court has also held that "the Lanham Act defines
'commerce' as 'all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,'
thereby 'conferring broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United
States.'" Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 695 (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 283-84 (1952)).
111. See, eg., United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 92 (holding Lanham Act applied to
defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiffs mark for political purposes); L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Commercial adver-
tising slogans, which can be registered as trademarks, have become part of na-
tional political campaigns."); Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 700 ("[I]n the marketplace
of ideas - use of another's trademark to identify the source of your own political
views is simple trademark infringement."); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save
Brach's Coal. For Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 475-76 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding "solicit-
ing donations, preparing press releases, holding public meetings and press confer-
ences, propounding proposals for the reorganization of [the plaintiff's] ownership
and/or management, and other activities designed to bring about change in the
[plaintiff's] organization and enhance the stability of workers' jobs" are "services"
to which Lanham Act applies ); MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol,
774 F. Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The seriousness and virtue of a cause do
not confer any right to the use of the trademark of another."); Planned Parenthood,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *14 (holding Lanham Act applied to defendant
even though defendant had "a political motive" for using plaintiffs mark); Order
Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 5, Henley v. DeVore, 210 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67987 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 09-0481) [hereinafter Henley Motion to Dismiss
Decision] (explaining "political activities may constitute services" under Lanham
Act). But see Tax Cap Comm. v. Save Our Everglades, Inc., 933 F. Supp 1077, 1081
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (denying motion for emergency preliminary injunction and dis-
missing Lanham Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because court
held solicitation of signatures as part of campaign to amend state constitution did
not constitute services "being rendered in commerce" for purpose of Lanham Act
jurisdiction).
112. See, e.g., United We Stand, at 128 F.3d at 90 ("The resulting confusion [due
to different organizations employing the same trade name to endorse candidates]
would be catastrophic; voters would have no way of understanding the significance
of an endorsement or position taken by parties of recognized major names.");
Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Indeed, the
[Lanham] Act's purpose of reducing consumer confusion supports application of
the Act to political speech, where the consequences of widespread confusion as to
the source of such speech could be dire"); Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 696-
97 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (granting preliminary injunction precluding organization affili-
ated with Democratic Party from running candidates under party name "Represen-
tation for Every Person Party" and using slogan "Vote REP April 7" in "Republican
stronghold"). Strongly voicing its disapproval, the court in Tomei v. Finley said that
the defendant's deceptive political tactic was "a page from the Watergate book of
'dirty tricks,'" an "impermissible distortion" of the First Amendment's protections,
and the kind of "lie" the Supreme Court held to be unprotected by the First
Amendment. Tomei, 512 F. Supp. at 698 (citing Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964)).
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3. False Association or Endorsement Liability under the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends liability for trade-
mark misappropriation beyond consumer confusion as to source
identification.' 13 Under Section 43(a), trademark owners are pro-
tected against the misappropriation of their trademarks if the mis-
appropriation (1) is likely to cause consumer confusion by creating
a false association with or endorsement by the trademark holder or
(2) constitutes false advertising. 114 Accordingly, trademark rights
protect against consumer confusion regarding a "plaintiffs spon-
sorship or approval of defendant or defendant's products." 15
Courts consider the same likelihood of confusion factors when de-
termining liability for false association, endorsement, or advertising
as they do when determining liability for consumer confusion re-
garding the source of trademarked goods.116 In 1995, the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act created liability for trademark misappro-
priation that causes "dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnish-
113. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REv 49,
57 (2008) (explaining significance of Section 43(a)'s expansion of trademark
rights).
114. See 15 U.S.C.S. 1125(a) (1) (LexisNexis 2010) (codifying liability for false
affiliation and false advertising by unauthorized use of trademarks). Though the
text of Section 43(a) only lists false "affiliation, connection, or association" as
grounds for liability, courts have interpreted Section 43(a) as extending liability to
false endorsement. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir.
2003) (explaining liability under Section 43(a) includes unauthorized use of trade-
marks resulting in consumer confusion as to "sponsorship or approval"); EMI Cata-
logue P'ship v Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., No. 99-7022, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30761, at *10 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2000) ("If consumers believe that the
trademark owner sponsors or endorses the use of the challenged mark, the confu-
sion requirement is satisfied [under Section 43(a)]."); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Section 43(a) as encompassing false
endorsements created by unauthorized appropriation of protected trademarks);
Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472,
475 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("[T]he Lanham Act is concerned not only with confusion
over the source of goods but also with deceptive appearances of approval.").
115. McGeveran, supra note 113, at 57 (explaining significance of Section
43(a)'s expansion of trademark rights) (internal quotations omitted).
116. SeeTime, Inc. v. Petersen Publ. Co., 173 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999)
(explaining likelihood of confusion standards for claims brought under Section
43(a)); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)
1400 (applying Sleekcraft Factors to decide false endorsement claim brought under
Section 43(a)); MasterCard Int'l., Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00-
6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (applying Polar-
oid Factors to decide false endorsement claim brought under Section 43(a); Parks
v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 446-48 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing application of
Sleekcraft Factors when determining liability under Section 43(a)).
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ment."117 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, however,
exempted noncommercial uses of trademarks from liability.118
Lanham Act protections under Section 43(a) are not only in-
voked by marketplace competitors.119 A celebrity can own trade-
mark rights for his or her identity or persona, for which he or she
has "an economic interest .. . akin to that of' a commercial trade-
mark holder.120 Likewise, the Lanham Act also protects distinctive
attributes, such as a singer's voice or a celebrity's physical appear-
ance. 121 Accordingly, celebrities and well-known individuals have
filed Lanham Act claims for false association, endorsement, or ad-
vertising against companies that used their identities or personas
for commercial purposes.122 When analyzing the likelihood of con-
fusion factors in Lanham Act cases involving celebrities, courts ex-
amine the "level of recognition that the celebrity enjoys among
members of society" to determine the "strength of the plaintiffs
mark."s23 Likewise, the "relatedness or proximity of the products"
refers to "the reasons for or source of the plaintiffs fame."' 24
In Nader, MasterCard brought the following Lanham Act
claims: (1) false endorsement pursuant to Section 43(a); (2) the
unauthorized use of its federally registered trademark pursuant to
Section 32(1); and (3) trademark dilution pursuant to the Section
117. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c) (codifying trademark protections for trademark
dilution); see also McGeveran, supra note 113, at 57 (discussing expansion of trade-
mark rights). Dilution occurs when the unauthorized use of a trademark "bring[s]
to mind two products, not one." Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
118. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c) (3) (C) (exempting any "noncommercial use of
a mark" from liability for trademark dilution); see also Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3644, at *22 ("The Federal Trademark Dilution Act specifically exempts noncom-
mercial uses of a mark from its coverage.").
119. See Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1824 ("However, the scope of section 43(a)
is broad enough that it extends beyond disputes between commercial
competitors.").
120. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 445 (discussing celebrities' trademark rights and
economic interests in their identities (citing Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093,
1110 (9th Cir. 1992))); see also Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC, 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir.
1996) (explaining Lanham Act claims for false endorsement "based on the unau-
thorized use of a celebrity's identity" is actionable as trademark infringement);
White, 971 F.2d at 1400 ("In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celeb-
rity plaintiff, 'mark' means the celebrity's persona.").
121. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
Section 43(a) recognizes false endorsements claims "premised on the unautho-
rized imitation of an entertainer's distinctive voice" or physical appearance).
122. See, e.g., Parks, 329 F.3d at 441 (involving Civil Rights Movement hero
Rosa Parks); Adbul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 409 (involving basketball legend Kareem Ab-
dul-Jabbar); White, 971 F.2d at 1396 (involving television celebrity Vanna White).
123. See Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1829 (analyzing likelihood of confusion
factors in celebrity cases).
124. Id.
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43(c).12 5 There were two MasterCard trademarks at issue in Nader
(1) "There are some things money can't buy. For everything else
there's MasterCard."; and (2) "Priceless."' 2 6 After balancing the Po-
laroid factors, the court held that there was no likelihood of confu-
sion between the two advertisements. 127 Thus, the Nader campaign
was not liable for trademark dilution because the Nader Advertise-
ment was political rather than commercial, placing the Advertise-
ment outside the scope of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act's.128
C. First Amendment Doctrines Applicable to Political
Campaigns and Intellectual Property Law
1. First Amendment's Protection of Political and Commercial Speech
The two types of speech that are relevant to disputes involving
the unauthorized use of intellectual property by political candidates
are core political speech and commercial speech.129 Core political
speech relates to public issues, the conduct of government, and
elections.130 Commercial speech is speech that is "related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."13
125. See MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00-
6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (listing trade-
mark claims).
126. Id. at *5.
127. See id. at *14 (holding Nader campaign did not violate Lanham Act).
128. See id. at *28 (holding Nader Advertisement to be exempt from liability
under Federal Trademark Dilution Act). In the alternative, the court held that
MasterCard failed to meet its burden of proving that the Nader Advertisements
diluted the distinctiveness of its trademarks. See id. at *29 (asserting court's find-
ing). For a further discussion of the noncommercial nature of the Nader Adver-
tisement, see infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
129. See Rumfelt, supra note 38, at 398-99 (discussing First Amendment in-
quiries in context of intellectual property disputes). Rumfelt argues that "where
core political speech is at issue, the First Amendment provides a more appropriate
governing analysis than any intellectual property test." Id. at 416.
130. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995)
(describing core political speech as "[d]iscussion of public issues," "debate on the
qualifications of candidates," "discussion of governmental affairs," and "conduct of
campaigns for political office" (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976)
(per curiam))); see also BLAcK's LAw DIcrlO1NARY, supra note 30, at 1276-77 (defin-
ing "political" and "politics"). Though political speech is commonly thought of as
relating to political campaigns and petitions, election referendums also fall under
the category of "core political speech." See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (explaining
scope of First Amendment's protection of core political speech).
131. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (defining commercial speech); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining commer-
cial speech as that which "does no more than propose a commercial transaction"
(internal quotations omitted)).
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Governmental and judicial restrictions on political speech and
campaigns operate in "an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities" 3 2 because the "role that elected officials
play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be
allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public
importance."133 As the Supreme Court noted in the landmark elec-
tion-law case Buckley v. Valeo,134 the First Amendment "has its fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns
for political office." 3 5 Accordingly, courts review infringements on
core political speech under the highest constitutional standard- ex-
acting scrutiny.'3 6 When applying exacting scrutiny, courts will only
uphold regulations that are "narrowly tailored to serve an overrid-
ing state interest."137 For commercial speech, the Constitution "ac-
cords a lesser protection .. . than [it does for] other constitutionally
guaranteed expression."13 8
In American Family Life Insurance Co. (AFLAC) v. Hagan, 39 the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio addressed the dis-
tinction between commercial and core political speech in the con-
132. Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.
Supp. 957, 959-60 (D.N.H. 1978) (cautioning courts must proceed very carefully
when limiting speech in political campaigns (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1976) (per curiam))).
133. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002) (involv-
ing dispute over Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibit-
ing candidates for judicial office from announcing their "views on disputed legal
or political issues").
134. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
135. Id. at 15 (discussing general First Amendment principles). In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld the individual campaign contribution limits, dis-
closure requirements, and public financing system for presidential elections under
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, but held that the Act's limits on cam-
paign expenditures, independent expenditures by individuals and groups, as well
as, personal campaign expenditures by candidates were unconstitutional. See id. at
143 (setting forth holding).
136. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)
("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we
uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest.").
137. Id. In cases involving core political speech, the burden is on the govern-
ment to show the existence of an overriding state interest. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (U.S. 1978) ("[T]he burden is on the government to
show the existence of such an interest." (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362
(1976))).
138. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (analyzing constitutional standard for protection of commercial
speech).
139. 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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text of a political campaign.o4 0 In Hagan, the campaign of Ohio
gubernatorial candidate Tim Hagan posted an internet advertise-
ment featuring a "crudely animated character made up of [his op-
ponent] Governor Taft's head sitting on the body of a white
cartoon duck," which quacks "TaftQuack several times during each
commercial" (the "Hagan Advertisement") .141 The figure in the
Hagan Advertisement resembled the well-known quacking duck in
AFLAC's insurance commercials.142 The Hagan Advertisement also
solicited campaign donations through an internet link.14 3 The
court held that, for the purposes of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act's exemption on noncommercial uses of trademarks, the
solicitation of contributions by the Hagan Advertisement was "com-
pletely noncommercial political speech."14 4 The court opined that
it was "arguable whether Hagan's speech propose [d] a commercial
transaction at all."14 5 Rather, the Hagan Advertisement discussed
"public issues and challenge [d] the qualifications of a political
candidate."' 4 6
In Nader, the S.D.N.Y. found the Hagan court's reasoning to be
"persuasive," holding the Nader Advertisement exempt from liabil-
ity under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act because its use of
MasterCard's trademarks was political in nature.147 Additionally,
the court applied the reasoning in its trademark dilution analysis to
hold that the Nader Advertisement was noncommercial for the pur-
pose of fair use.14 8
140. See id. at 695-97 (analyzing whether speech at issue was commercial or
noncommercial ).
141. Id. at 685.
142. See id. at 686 (describing similarities between sound of duck in Hagan
Advertisement and trademarked duck sound in AFLAC's advertisements).
143. See id. at 697 (describing internet link for viewers to donate to Hagan
campaign).
144. Id.; see also Federal Election Com'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Cam-
paign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001) ("Spending for political ends and contrib-
uting to political candidates both fall within the First Amendment's protection of
speech and political association.").
145. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
146. Id.
147. See MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00-
6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *23-28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding Na-
der Advertisement was political in nature).
148. See id. at *37 ("As this Court has already discussed, the [Nader Advertise-
ment's] use is not commercial."); see also Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v.
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (holding defen-
dant's campaign advertisement that incorporated plaintiffs copyrighted was
"clearly part of a political campaign message, noncommercial in nature, and First
Amendment issues of freedom of expression in a political campaign are clearly
implicated").
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MasterCard argued that the Nader Advertisement was commer-
cial in nature because contributions to the Nader campaign in-
creased after the internet version of the Nader Advertisement,
which contained a "Donate On-line" link, was released. 14 9 The
court rejected that argument on two grounds.1 5 0 First, MasterCard
provided "no evidence of a causal connection between the [Nader
Advertisement] and the contributions."15 1 Alternatively, even if the
Nader Advertisement did spur an increase in donations to the Na-
der campaign, the court would have still held that the Nader Adver-
tisement was political in nature.15 2 The court opined that the
Nader Advertisement conveyed a "strong political message"- Na-
der's opinion that "other presidential candidates can be bought,
but that the 'truth,' represented by himself, cannot."1 5 3
The court warned that if it held the Nader Advertisement to be
commercial in nature solely because the advertisement increased
campaign contributions, "all political campaign speech would also
be 'commercial speech' since all political candidates collect contri-
butions."1 5 4 Such a holding would be inconsistent with the Lanham
Act's legislative history, which "clearly indicates that Congress did
not intend for the Act to chill political speech."1 55 The court also
quoted the following from the legislative history of the Act: "Politi-
cal advertising and promotion is political speech, and therefore not
encompassed by the [Lanham Act's] term 'commercial.' 1 56 Ac-
cordingly, viewing this case as analogous to Hagan, the court held
that the Nader Advertisement use of MasterCard's trademarks was
political in nature. 15 7 The court further supported its finding that
the Nader Advertisement was political in nature in its fair use analy-
149. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *23 (explaining MasterCard's
argument that Nader's Advertisement was commercial in nature). Donations to
the Nader campaign rose from $5,125 before the Nader Advertisement aired to
$818,000 in the month that it aired. See id. (noting effect of advertisement on
donations).
150. See id. at *23-28 (rejecting MasterCard's assertion that Nader's Advertise-
ment was commercial in nature).
151. Id. at *23 ("There is nothing in the record other than the inference to be
drawn from the proximity in time that advances the notion that the contributions
Ralph Nader and his political committee received were a direct result of the Ad.").
152. See id. at *23-24 (explaining why Nader Advertisement was political in
nature).
153. Id. at *24 (stating Nader Advertisement's political message).
154. Id. at *23-24.
155. Id. at *24.
156. Id. (quotingl34 CONG. REc. H. 1297 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement
of Wisc. Rep. Kastenmeier)).
157. See id. at *26-28 (holding Nader campaign's use of MasterCard's trade-
marks was political in nature and analogizing case to Hagan).
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sis, opining that the Nader Advertisement's stated purpose was to
"raise public awareness of Ralph Nader's desire to be included in
the upcoming televised Presidential candidate debates."15 s
2. First Amendment's Impact on the Copyright Act
The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are "intui-
tively in conflict" because of the contrary interests that they pro-
tect.159 In Eldred v. Ashcroft,160 however, the Supreme Court
explained that free speech protections are embodied in copyright
law. 161 Because the First Amendment and Copyright Clause were
adopted within a few years of each other, the Court reasoned that
the Framers viewed "copyright's limited monopolies" to be "com-
patible with free speech principles."1 62 The Court further ex-
plained that copyrights promote free expression and dissemination
of ideas by "establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression." 63
Additionally, the Court identified the Copyright Act's "built-in
First Amendment accommodations." 6 4 The Copyright Act pre-
cludes copyright ownership of ideas, facts and concepts while pro-
tecting the expression of such ideas, facts and concepts, which is
known as the "idea/expression dichotomy." 65 The idea/expres-
sion dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communica-
tion of facts while still protecting an author's expression"; it allows
the ideas, theories and facts behind copyrighted works to be "in-
stantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publica-
tion." 66 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the fair use defense
158. Id. at 37.
159. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2001) (explaining inherent conflict between Copyright Clause and First
Amendment).
160. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
161. See id. at 218-21 (evaluating relationship between copyright law and free
speech).
162. Id. at 219 (discussing original intent behind Copyright Clause).
163. Id. (discussing free speech protections inherent in copyright law).
164. Id. (explaining First Amendment protections contained in Copyright
Act).
165. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) (LexisNexis 2010) ("In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(referring to copyright law's protection of expression and lack of protection of
facts and ideas as "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy").
166. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper 6& Row, 471 U.S. at 556).
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protects the First Amendment rights of copyright users, "allow[ing]
the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copy-
righted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances."1 67
Because First Amendment protections are such an integral
part of copyright law, most courts do not conduct a separate First
Amendment analysis when adjudicating copyright infringement
claims. 168 In Eldred, the Court held that heighted judicial scrutiny
under the First Amendment was not warranted to determine the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, which ex-
tended the duration of copyright ownership by twenty years.16 9 The
Court did acknowledge that copyrights are not "categorically im-
167. Id. at 219-20.
168. Rumfelt, supra note 38, at 408 ("The majority of [copyright] cases, espe-
cially those decided in recent years, have taken the view that an independent First
Amendment analysis is unnecessary."); see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Miffin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Because of the First Amendment
principles built into copyright law through the idea/expression dichotomy and the
doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain related First Amendment ar-
guments in a copyright case."); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data,
Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly rejected First Amend-
ment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground that
First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doc-
trine."); Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.
Supp. 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978) ("Conflicts between interests protected by the First
Amendment and the copyright laws can be resolved by application of the fair use
doctrine."). But see Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir.
1992) (leaving open possibility that First Amendment could preclude liability for
copyright infringement in limited circumstances when expression, not idea, is only
aspect of work that is meaningful to "democratic dialogue" (citing 1 Melville B.
Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.10 [C] [2] (1992 ed.))); Pac. & S.
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1498-1500 (11th Cir. 1984) (engaging in separate,
albeit brief, First Amendment analyses to determine copyright infringement liabil-
ity of defendant and whether injunction was proper remedy). In Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth
Circuit declined to review whether the First Amendment provided a defense to a
copyright infringement claims. See id. at 1172. (asserting 5th Circuit holding).
The district court had held that the unauthorized copyright appropriation at issue
was protected by the First Amendment even though it was not fair use under the
Copyright Act. See id. at 1173 (noting district court holding); see also Triangle
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 881, 883-85
(S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Hence,
there is a conflict between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act, if as the
plaintiff contends, the Act should be applied in the case sub judice to strike down
defendant's activity."). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on
different grounds, holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's copyright was
fair use. Triangle Publ'ns, 626 F.2d at 1178. Accordingly, the court held that it was
not necessary to evaluate whether the First Amendment provided a constitutional
defense to the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim. Id. ("The majority con-
cludes that we need not, and should not, reach the First Amendment issue.").
169. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (holding Copyright Term Extension Act to be
constitutional under First Amendment).
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mune from challenges under the First Amendment." 70 The Court
explained that copyright law's "built-in free speech safeguards are
generally adequate to address" infringements on free speech result-
ing from copyright ownership.' 7 ' Accordingly, the Court held that
when, as in Eldred, "Congress has not altered the traditional con-
tours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is
unnecessary."172 Likewise, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,173 the Court rejected the respondents' argument that,
under the First Amendment, the "substantial public import" of cer-
tain copyrighted material excuses "a use that would ordinarily not
pass muster as a fair use."174 The Court held that the "First Amend-
ment protections already embodied" in the Copyright Act did not
justify "expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts
to a public figure exception to copyright."175
3. First Amendment's Impact on the Lanham Act
The First Amendment's can provide a defense to a Lanham Act
claim in a case involving the unauthorized use of a trademark for a
communicative purpose.176 Though the unauthorized use of a
trademark in political speech does not preclude Lanham Act liabil-
ity per se,177 the Lanham Act should not be used to "chill political
170. Id. ("We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it de-
clared copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amend-
ment.'" (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003))).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
174. Id. at 555-56, 560 (rejecting exception to copyright ownership rights if
unauthorized appropriation does not qualify as fair use). In Harper & Row, the
copyrighted material of "substantial public import" was excerpts from the memoirs
of former President Gerald Ford, which contained President Ford's reflections on
the, inter alia, the Watergate crisis, his pardon of former President Nixon, and his
reflections on "this period of history, and the morality and personalities involved."
Id. at 542-43.
175. Id. at 560.
176. See McGeveran, supra note 113, at 98 (noting that courts sometimes "en-
tertain[ ] a 'First Amendment defense' for expressive uses" of trademarks); see, e.g.,
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447-52 (6th Cir. 2003) (analyzing applica-
bility of First Amendment to Lanham Act claims involving artistic expression "even
if [the] evidence demonstrates some likelihood of confusion"); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 997-1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (analyzing First Amendment's application to
Lanham Act disputes when unauthorized use of trademark contains artistic expres-
sion); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp.
472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (explaining First Amendment's relevance to Lanham Act
disputes when unauthorized use of trademark contains communicative messages).
177. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("In
fact, courts that have applied the Lanham Act to noncommercial and political
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speech." 78 For trademark dilution claims in particular, political
speech is fully protected because the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act specifically excludes noncommercial uses of trademarks from
liability.17 9
As a threshold matter, the First Amendment only provides a
defense to a Lanham Act claim if the alleged infringer used the
trademark to convey a communicative message, not if the alleged
infringer used the trademark for source identification. 8 0 To deter-
mine if enforcing the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment
speech have implicitly rejected the theory that claims based on such speech are
barred, as a matter of law, based on the First Amendment . . . ."); see, e.g., United
We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am., N.Y., Inc. 128 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's trademarked name was
not protected by First Amendment even though trademarked name was used for
political purpose); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir.
1987) (explaining "protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give [the
defendant] license to infringe" plaintiffs trademark rights even though defendant
used plaintiffs logo in political speech regarding nuclear weapons); MGM-Pathe
Commc'ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (re-
jecting defendant's argument that unauthorized use of trademark in political
speech reduces Lanham Act protections for trademark owner).
178. See MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00-
6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) ("The legislative
history of the Lanham Act clearly indicates that Congress did not intend for the
Act to chill political speech."); see also Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 ("Because overexten-
sion of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amend-
ment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.").
179. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (LexisNexis 2010) (exempting "[a]ny
noncommercial use of a mark" from liability for trademark dilution); see also Nader,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *22 (explaining liability under Federal Trademark
Dilution Act).
180. See, eg., United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 93 (holding First Amendment did
not protect defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiffs mark for political purposes
because it was used for source identification rather than for commentary on
mark's owner); Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D.
Colo. 2000) (holding defendant's use of plaintiffs trademark in his domain name
was not protected by First Amendment because use lacked any communicative
message and was "analogous to source identification"); Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-0629, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *35 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 1997) ("Defendant's use of another entity's mark is entitled to First
Amendment protection when his use of that mark is part of a communicative mes-
sage, not when it is used to identify the source of a product."); Brach Van Houten
Holding, 856 F. Supp. at 476 ("[T] he trademark law generally prevails over the First
Amendment where the trademark functions to connote the source of the product
or message, rather than being used in a communicative message."); Yankee Publ'g,
Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
When another's trademark (or a confusingly similar mark) is used with-
out permission for the purpose of source identification, the trademark law gen-
erally prevails over the First Amendment. ...
However, when unauthorized use of another's mark is part of a commu-
nicative message and not a source identifier, the First Amendment is im-
plicated in opposition to the trademark right.
Id.
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rights of the alleged infringer, courts generally apply one of three
tests: (1) the "likelihood of confusion" test; (2) the "alternative ave-
nues" test; or (3) the Rogers v. Grimaldit8 test, which is commonly
known as the Rogers or "artistic relevance" test.182 The federal cir-
cuit courts are split as to which test is the proper method for balanc-
ing First Amendment and trademark interests, and the Second
Circuit has even applied more than one test.183
Under the likelihood of confusion test, courts apply a standard
likelihood of confusion analysis, such as evaluating the Polaroid or
Sleekcraft factors, without a separate First Amendment analysis.184
Proponents of this approach argue that "intellectual property law,
including trademark law, has built-in mechanisms that operate to
avoid First Amendment concerns."1 85 The likelihood of confusion
test has been inferred from the Ninth Circuit's Lanham Act analysis
in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.186 and "ob-
liquely endorsed" by the Tenth Circuit.187 Critics, however, fault
this approach for giving "no weight to First Amendment concerns"
because it treats items with artistic expression the same as noncom-
municative commercial products.'88
181. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (discuss-
ing standards courts apply to balance First Amendment and trademark interests);
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (referring to Rogers Test as "artistic relevance" test).
183. See Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1820 n.23 (noting circuit split); see also
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 n.4 (establishing artistic relevance test in Second Circuit
and distinguishing, but not overruling, previous application of alterative avenues
test in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (ap-
plying alternative avenues test).
184. See Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1828-29 (describing likelihood of confu-
sion approach).
185. Id. at 1829 ; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003) (differentiating First Amendment
protections inherent in traditional infringement determinations from those of
trademark dilution determinations by noting trademark infringement's likelihood
of confusion analysis has "built-in First Amendment compass"). The Mattel court,
however, applied and, thus, implicitly adopted the Rogers test. See id. at 902 (apply-
ing Rogers test).
186. 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The issue in trademark infringe-
ment actions is not the alleged appropriation of [the plaintiffs] creative expres-
sion, but rather, the likelihood of confusion in the market place as to the source of
[the alleged infringer's product]").
187. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 448 (outlining origin of likelihood of confusion test
(citing Films of Distinction, Inc., v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068,
1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95
F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996))).
188. See id. at 449 (rejecting likelihood of confusion approach); see also
Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1830 (explaining arguments against likelihood of confu-
sion approach).
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Under the alternative avenues test, enforcing the trademark
holder's Lanham Act rights does not violate the First Amendment
when there are "sufficient alternative means" of communication
available. 189 Courts that apply the alternative avenues test view
trademarks as property rights that need not "yield to the exercise of
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alter-
native avenues of communication exist."190 Those courts reason
that, if alternative means of communication are available, neither
the speaker nor the public are deprived the benefit of the speaker's
ideas. 191 Accordingly, the alternative avenues test is very deferential
to the property rights of the trademark holder.1 9 2
The seminal case for the alternative avenues test is Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner.1o3 In Lloyd Corp., anti-war protesters were ejected from a
privately-owned shopping mall after they tried to distribute anti-war
handbills. 194 Holding that there was no constitutional violation, the
Court introduced the fundamental principle of the alternative ave-
nues test.195 The Court explained that infringing on the mall
owner's property rights while the protesters had sufficient alterna-
tive means to exercise their First Amendment rights "would dimin-
ish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted
right of free speech."196 The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to
189. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 448 (explaining standard for alternative avenues
test).
190. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussy-
cat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (Same); Brach Van Houten
Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(Same).
191. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d 397 at 402 ("Because the injunc-
tion leaves open many such avenues of expression, it deprives neither [the defen-
dant] nor the public of the benefits of his ideas."); see also Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d at 206 (explaining district court did not infringe on
defendants' First Amendment rights by enjoining use of plaintiffs trademark be-
cause "numerous" other means of communication were available).
192. See Rumfelt, supra note 38, at 405 (opining alternative avenues test "pays
strong deference to a trademark owner's property right").
193. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
194. See id. at 556 (describing dispute).
195. See id. at 567 ("It would be an unwarranted infringement of property
rights to require [the property owner] to yield to the exercise of First Amendment
rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
exist."). The Court's main reason for finding no constitutional violation was that
the mall was private property. See id. at 570 (holding there was no dedication of
"privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respon-
dents to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights").
196. Id. at 567.
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have adopted the alternative avenues test as its standard for evaluat-
ing First Amendment rights in Lanham Act disputes.19 7
The First, Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have either re-
jected or significantly limited the alternative avenues test because,
inter alia, (1) the test does not sufficiently protect the right to free
expression, (2) trademark and real property rights should not be
analogized for the purpose of balancing property rights with First
Amendment rights and (3) the test could require a court to criti-
cally evaluate creative necessity.19 8 In Parks v. LaFace Records,199 the
Sixth Circuit rejected the alternative avenues test.2 00 The court
noted the "awkwardness of analogizing property rights in land to
197. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988) (applying alternative avenues test to Lanham Act
dispute); see also Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. for Chi.,
856 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying alternative avenues test to hold
First Amendment did not preclude preliminary injunction in Lanham Act dis-
pute). Following Mutual of Omaha, the Eight Circuit applied a balancing test that
weighed "the public interest in free expression against the public interest in avoid-
ing consumer confusion," but the alternative avenues test and balancing approach
have been found to be consistent. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods.,
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998) ("The Eighth Circuit has framed the
applicable standard in two different, yet consistent, ways.").
198. See Zimdahl, supra note 85, at 1831-32 (outlining courts' rationale for
rejecting alternative avenues test); see, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,
450 (6th Cir. 2003) ("To suggest that other words can be used as well to express an
author's or composer's message is not a proper test for weighing First Amendment
rights."); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th
Cir. 1996) ("[I]n the context of intellectual property, Lloyd's 'no adequate alterna-
tive avenues' test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free
expression."); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We cannot
indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without run-
ning a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." (quoting Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971))); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d
26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The first amendment [sic] issues involved in this [Lanham
Act] case cannot be disposed of by equating the rights of a trademark owner with
the rights of an owner of real property."). The Second Circuit, however, had previ-
ous employed the alternative avenues test in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pus-
sycat Cinema, Ltd. See 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying alternative
avenues test to rule that upholding plaintiffs trademark rights does not violate
defendant's First Amendment rights). The Rogers court subsequently held that
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders did not require the courts in the Second Circuit to apply
the alternative avenues test to all intellectual property disputes- it was unique and
distinguishable in that it involved "blatantly false advertising." See Rogers, 875 F.2d
at 999 n.4 (limiting application of Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders in Lanham Act
disputes).
199. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
200. See id. at 449-50 (discussing inappropriateness of applying alternative ave-
nues test to Lanham Act disputes). In Parks, the rap duo OutKast titled one of its
hit songs Rosa Parks. Id. at 442. In the opening lyrics, the song's subjects were
moved to the back of a bus, resistance to which made Rosa Parks a hero of the Civil
Rights Movement. See id. at 442 (describing facts of dispute). The song's opening
lyrics were: "Ah huh, hush that fuss. Everybody move to the back of the bus." Id.
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property rights in words or ideas."201 For a communicative mes-
sage, a change in wording is usually much more significant to the
overall message's effectiveness than a difference in the location
from which the message is communicated. 2 02 Furthermore, apply-
ing the alternative avenues test to a Lanham Act dispute would re-
quire a court to evaluate whether the unauthorized use of a
trademark is "necessary" to communicate an idea, which according
to the Parks court, is an inappropriate evaluation for the judiciary to
make.203
Finally, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania have adopted the Rogers test to de-
termine if the Lanham Act's restrictions apply to an artistic work.204
The Rogers test only permits the Lanham Act to preclude the use of
a trademark in a work that contains artistic expression when "the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the pub-
lic interest in free expression." 2 0 5 Accordingly, the Lanham Act will
only apply when (1) the use of the trademark has "no artistic rele-
vance to the underlying work" or (2) if the use of the trademark has
artistic relevance, that use "explicitly misleads as to the source or
the content of the work."206 The Rogers court limited the test to
cases arising in the "context of allegedly misleading titles using a
celebrity's name,"2 07 but courts have since expanded its scope to
201. Id. at 450.
202. See id. ("The difference between the almost-right word and the right
word is really a large matter - it's the difference between the 'lightning-bug' and
the 'lightning.'").
203. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 (rejecting alternative avenues test).
204. See id. at 448, 451-52 (adopting Rogers test and discussing how it has been
adopted by Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and Eastern District of Pennsylvania);
see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopt-
ing Rogers test); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 665
(5th Cir. 2000) (stating Fifth Circuit has adopted Rogers test); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d. 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (establishing artistic relevance test); Seale v. Gra-
mercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 339-40 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying Rogers test).
205. Rogers, 875 F.2d. at 999 (setting forth standards for First Amendment
analysis involving Lanham Act disputes).
206. Id. (establishing artistic relevance test). Under the second prong of the
Rogers test, the standard likelihood of confusion factors, such as the Polaroid factors,
are applied to determine whether the use is "explicitly misleading." See Westchester
Media, 214 F.3d at 664-65 (explaining standard for Rogers test (citing Twin Peaks
Prods. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1993))). "However,
the likelihood of confusion must be 'particularly compelling' to outweigh the First
Amendment interests at stake." Id.
207. Rogers, 875 F.2d. at 999 (applying artistic relevance test in case involving
fictional movie titled "Ginger and Fred," which calls to mind Ginger Roger and
Fred Astaire).
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cover any work of artistic expression. 208 After rejecting the likeli-
hood of confusion and alternative avenues tests, the Parks court ap-
plied the Rogers test, opining that it is the "most appropriate
method to balance the public interest in avoiding consumer confu-
sion with the public interest in free expression." 2 0 9
D. Recent Cases Involving the Unauthorized Use of Music
in Political Campaigns
Since the 2008 presidential campaign, there have been two
high-profile cases involving the unauthorized use of music in politi-
cal a campaign. In August 2008, Jackson Browne filed suit against
Republican presidential candidate John McCain, the Republican
National Committee (the "RNC"), and the Ohio Republican Party
(the "ORP" and, collectively, the "Browne Defendants") after the
Browne Defendants used Browne's hit song Running on Empty in a
television advertisement without Browne's permission. 210 The fol-
lowing April, Don Henley filed suit against Republican senatorial
candidate Charles DeVore and the DeVore campaign's Director of
Internet Strategies and New Media (collectively, the "Henley De-
fendants") for incorporating two of Henley's songs into consecutive
internet advertisements in support of DeVore's candidates for the
2010 Republican nomination for California's U.S. Senate seat.2 11
1. Browne v. McCain212
During the 2009 presidential campaign, the ORP released a
campaign commercial that mocked a comment made by Demo-
cratic presidential candidate and future President Barack Obama
(the "McCain Advertisement"). 213 The conclusion of the McCain
208. See, Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Thus, we hold that the Rogers balancing approach is
generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression, a
category that includes parody."); Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 339-40 (applying Rogers test
to dispute involving unauthorized use of well-known political figure Bobby Seale's
name and likeness to promote and advertise film).
209. Parks, F.3d at 448-50 (explaining rationale for adopting Rogers test).
210. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 2 (describing dispute).
211. See Henley Complaint, supra note 14, 11 19, 24-25 (describing dispute).
212. 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal 2009); 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal.
2009); 612 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The only decision issued in Browne
v. McCain was a ruling on the Browne Defendants' respective motions to dismiss,
for which the court issued a separate decision for each defendant.
213. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 2 (describing McCain Advertise-
ment); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076-77 (Same). The McCain Advertisement was
aired on television and posted on the internet. See id. at 1077. (discussing airing
and posting of Advertisement).
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Advertisement showed a clip of Obama suggesting that people can
reduce the United States' energy consumption by ensuring that the
tires on their cars are properly inflated. 2 1 4 While that clip of
Obama was playing, Running on Empty was also playing in the back-
ground.215 Because the Browne Defendants neither sought nor re-
ceived a license for the use of Running on Empty, Browne filed suit
for, inter alia, copyright infringement and false endorsement under
the Lanham Act.2 1 6 In his complaint, Browne claimed that Mc-
Cain's politics directly conflicted with "the political and social val-
ues that Browne has espoused and supported throughout his
career."217 On November 17, 2008, the Browne Defendants filed
separate motions to dismiss. 218 The complaint against the ORP was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction,2 19 but the court upheld
Browne's claims against both McCain and the RNC. 2 2 0
The court declined to evaluate McCain's or the RNC's fair use
arguments because the facts alleged in the complaint were insuffi-
cient to conduct a fair use analysis. 221 The court explained, "[I]n
order to undertake the fair use analysis, a court usually must make
factual findings, or rely on undisputed or admitted material
214. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 2 (describing McCain Advertise-
ment); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076-77 (Same).
215. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 2; Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076-
77 (Same).
216. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 2, 19-38 (setting forth claims);
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (listing Browne's claims).
217. Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 1. Browne claimed that he initiated
legal action to "vindicate an egregious, intentional false association created by
agents of the presumptive Republican candidate for President of the United
States." Id.
218. See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defen-
dant John McCain's Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b) (6), Browne v. McCain,
611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-05334), 2008 WL 4994419; Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant the Republican Na-
tional Committee's Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), Browne v. McCain,
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-05334), 2008 WL 4994423; Defen-
dant Ohio Republican Party's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to FRCP 12(b) (2), (3), &(6) Or Transfer
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) &1406(a), Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d
1118 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-05334), 2008 WL 4994420.
219. Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (dis-
missing complaint against ORP for lack of sufficient minimum contacts with
California).
220. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (denying McCain's motion to dismiss
copyright and trademark infringement claims); Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d
1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying RNC's motion to dismiss copyright and
trademark infringement claims).
221. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (denying McCain's motion to dismiss
copyright infringement claim); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (denying RNC's
motion to dismiss copyright infringement claim).
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facts."222 The court also held that neither McCain nor the RNC
established that Browne's claim was barred as a matter of law solely
because the McCain Advertisement was political speech.223
Additionally, the court rejected McCain's and the RNC's argu-
ment that Browne's Lanham Act claim failed as a matter of law. 2 2 4
First, the court explained that the Lanham Act applies to noncom-
mercial speech.225 Next, the court held that neither McCain nor
the RNC had established the following to justify the court dis-
missing Browne's claim under the Rogers test: (1) the McCain Ad-
vertisement was an "artistic" work; and (2) the First Amendment
precluded Browne's trademark infringement claim as a matter of
law solely because the McCain Advertisement was noncommercial,
political speech.226 Using the same logic as used in its fair use anal-
ysis, the court reasoned that prior jurisprudence did not support
the position that Lanham Act claims involving political speech
should be dismissed as a matter of law on First Amendment
grounds.227 Finally, the court held that both McCain and the RNC
222. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (explaining courts' standard for fair
use evaluations (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 560 (1985)); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (Same). The court emphasized
the importance of discovery when ruling on the fair use defense. See Browne, 611
F. Supp. 2d at 1078 ("As a result [of the parties not having had a full opportunity
to conduct discovery], Plaintiff is not yet aware of all relevant and material facts
supporting his claim and potentially refuting Senator McCain's fair use defense.");
Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 ("As a result [of the parties not having had a full
opportunity to conduct discovery], Plaintiff is not yet aware of all relevant and
material facts supporting his claim and potentially refuting RNC's fair use
defense.").
223. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 ("The mere fact that Plaintiffs claim
is based on Defendants' use of his copyrighted work in a political campaign does
not bar Plaintiffs claim as a matter of law."); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130
(Same).
224. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (upholding Browne's Lanham Act
claims); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (Same).
225. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (explaining liability under Lanham
Act for unauthorized uses of mark in political speech); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at
1131 (Same). The court also reinforced prior holdings of other courts by explain-
ing that the phrase "in commerce" contained in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
is a jurisdictional precondition rather than a requirement that a mark be used
commercially for a defendant to incur liability under the Lanham Act. See Browne,
611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (discussing phrase "in commerce"); Browne, 612 F. Supp.
2d at 1131-32 (Same). For a further discussion of other circuits' interpretation of
the phrase "in commerce," see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
226. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (holding that McCain failed to meet
burden to dismiss under Rogers test); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (holding that
RNC failed to meet burden to dismiss under Rogers test).
227. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 ("In fact, courts that have applied the
Lanham Act to noncommercial and political speech have implicitly rejected the
theory that claims based on such speech are barred, as a matter of law, based on
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failed to meet their burden of demonstrating Browne's inability to
show likelihood of confusion as a matter of law.228
Browne, however, was never adjudicated at trial. In August
2009, the court approved an out-of-court settlement, which in-
cluded a public apology issued by McCain. 229
2. Henley v. DeVore230
As Browne was being settled, Don Henley filed a copyright and
trademark infringement suit against the Henley Defendants in
April 2009.231 To promote DeVore's campaign for the Republican
nomination for California's U.S. Senate seat, the Henley Defend-
ants altered the lyrics of Henley's song Boys of Summer in an internet
article and online video that criticized President Obama and his
supporters (the "Summer Secondary Work").232 Two weeks after
the initial video, the Henley Defendants released a second online
the First Amendment and artistic relevance test."); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1132
(Same).
228. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080-81 (holding McCain had not met
burden to dismiss Lanham Act claim as a matter of law); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at
1133 (holding that RNC had not met burden to dismiss Lanham Act claim as a
matter of law). The court's holding was influenced by the Defendants' failure to
address every Sleekcraft factor in their respective motions. See Browne, 611 F. Supp.
2d at 1081 (noting McCains's failure to address Sleekcraft factor); Browne, 612 F.
Supp. 2d at 1133 (noting RNC's failure to address Sleekcraft factor). Also, the court
held that the defendants' contention that the McCain Advertisement "clearly iden-
tifie[d] its source as ORP, alone, [did] not show that a consumer could not possi-
bly be confused as to whether Browne endorsed RNC, Senator McCain, or ORP."
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
229. See Order on Joint Stipulation Re Dismissal of Entire Action at 2, Browne
v McCain, 2009 WL 2912982 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-05334) [hereinafter Browne
Settlement Order] (dismissing action without prejudice); Alex Dobuzinskis, Jackson
Browne Wins Republican Apology Over Song, REUTERs, (July 21, 2009, 7:26 PM), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/musicNews/id-USTRE56K50420090721 (describing
publicly known details of settlement).
230. No. 09-0481, 210 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2010).
231. See Henley Complaint, supra note 14, 1 43-76 (stating Henley's intellec-
tual property claims).
232. See id. 1 24-25 (setting forth factual allegations). The song Boys of Sum-
mer is about a man reminiscing about a summer romance. See id. 1 19 (describing
basis of song). In the Summer Secondary Work, Obama is the singer's love inter-
est and the singer is "dreaming wistfully of the time before President Obama's
election." See Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 2, Henley v. DeVore, 210 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67987 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 09-0481) [hereinafter Henley Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss] (describing Summer Secondary Work). The Summer Secondary
Work then "asks whether the parties' nafve love affair can survive" what the Henley
Defendants call "President Obama's broken promises and failure to deliver on the
promised 'hope.'" Id. The Henley Defendants titled the Summer Secondary
Work The Hope of November. See Henley, 210 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
June 19, 2010) (stating title of Summer Secondary Work).
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video that incorporated a differnt Henley song, All She Wants to Do is
Dance, to critique Democratic Senator Barbra Boxer (the "Dance
Secondary Work" and, collectively with the Summer Secondary
Work, the "DeVore Secondary Works"), who was the incumbent
holding the office for which DeVore was running.233 The Henley
Defendants moved to dismiss Henley's Lanham Act claim for false
endorsement, but the court denied the motion because, inter alia,
Henley's complaint sufficiently plead misappropriation of a distinc-
tive attribute.23 4 Additionally, citing to its decision in Browne, the
court rejected the Henley Defendant's argument that Henley's Lan-
ham Act claim must fail as a matter of law because the defendants
used Henley's songs in noncommercial, political speech. 235 The
court subsequently granted Henley summary judgment on his copy-
right claim and granted the defendants summary judgment on
Henley's Lanham Act claim. 236
In its summary judgment opinion, the court held that the Hen-
ley Defendants did not meet their burden of establishing fair use. 2 3 7
In its analysis of the first fair use factor, the court held that the
DeVore Secondary Works were satire because they merely "evoked
the same themes of the original in order to attack an entirely sepa-
rate subject."2 38 Though the court found slight parody of Henley in
the Summer Secondary Work, parody was a very minor element of
that work because the work's main target was Obama and his sup-
233. See Henley Complaint, supra note 14, 1 37 (describing Dance Secondary
Work). The Dance Secondary Work "asserts that the American government,
through Barbara Boxer and her comrades in Washington -and with the support of
Hollywood's liberal elite (of which Henley is proudly a member) - are inserting
themselves into the American economy and enriching the government and certain
special interests through immoral tax policies." Henley Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 232, at 3. The Henley Defendants titled the Dance Secondary Work All
She Wants to Do is Tax. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *5 (describing
Dance Secondary Work).
234. See Henley Motion to Dismiss Decision, supra note 111, at 14 (denying Hen-
ley Defendants' motion to dismiss Henley's Lanham Act claim).
235. See Henley Motion to Dismiss Decision, supra note 111, at 3-8 (explaining
Lanham Act liability extends to political activities); see also Henley Defendants'Motion
to Dismiss, supra note 232, at 11-13 (arguing Lanham Act did not apply to DeVore
Secondary Works because they were "pure political speech").
236. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *66 (summarizing holding).
237. See id. at *51 (granting Henley summary judgment on copyright infringe-
ment claim).
238. Id. at *33. The court found that the Summer Secondary Work did not
comment on any of the original song's content, such as nostalgia or summer
romances, but rather, it used "those themes and devices to mock a separate subject
entirely, namely Obama and his supporters." Id. at *29. Likewise, the Dance Sec-
ondary Work used the same themes as All She Wants to Do is Dance "to comment on
entirely different subjects, namely Barbara Boxer, taxation, global warming, and
the proposed cap-and-trade program." Id. at *32.
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porters.239 Furthermore, the court found that neither the Summer
Secondary Work offered commentary on the liberal political under-
tones in Boys of Summer nor the Dance Secondary Work commented
on the "explicit social commentary" contained in All She Wants to Do
is Dance.240 Applying Ninth Circuit precedent, the court also held
that the DeVore Secondary Works were commercial in nature be-
cause the Henley Defendants "benefitted or gained an advantage
without having to pay customary licensing fees."241
The fourth fair use factor also weighed against the Henley De-
fendants. 2 4 2 The court reasoned that it could not hold, as a matter
of law, that the "widespread dissemination of similar satirical spins"
on Henley's songs would not harm the market for the original
works, even though it was not clear that the DeVore Secondary
Works actually threatened the markets of Henley's songs.2 43 Re-
garding the potential effects that the DeVore Secondary Works
might have on the market for derivates of Henley's songs, the court
held that the Henley Defendants submitted "no evidence demon-
strating that [the DeVore Secondary Works] would not usurp the
potential licensing market" for the original songs.244
The court granted summary judgment to the Henley Defend-
ants for Henley's Lanham Act claim. 245 The court began its analysis
by distinguishing between the unauthorized use of a singer's dis-
239. See id. at *31 (finding parody of Henley could be reasonably perceived in
Summer Secondary Work because it targeted Obama's supporters, which includes
Henley). The court qualified this finding with "assuming that criticism of the au-
thor can qualify as parody." Id.
240. See id. at *27-33 (rejecting Henley Defendants' argument that DeVore
Secondary Works were parody). In the final verse of Boys of Summer, the song's
narrator describes seeing a "Deadhead sticker on a Cadillac." Id. at *27. Citing an
interview that Henley gave to Rolling Stone magazine in which he explained the
meaning of that verse, the Henley Defendants argued that the song's narrator is
"bemoaning the failure of 1960's liberal politics (symbolized by the Deadhead
sticker) to change the status quo (symbolized by the Cadillac)." Id. at *28. The
court also accepted the Henley Defendants' assertion that All She Wants to Do is
Dance should be interpreted as criticizing the United States' foreign policy in Latin
America during the 1980s and the corresponding indifference of the American
public. See id. at *32 (interpreting meaning of All She Wants to Do is Dance).
241. Id. at *38 (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
242. See id. at *44-49 (analyzing fourth fair use factor).
243. See id. at *45-46. When analyzing market effects under the fourth fair use
factor, courts must consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the
sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market for the original." Id. at 45 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
244. Id. at *4748.
245. See id. at *66 (awarding Henley Defendants summary judgment on Lan-
ham Act claim).
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tinctive attribute and the unauthorized use of a musician's prior
performance of a song. 2 4 6 A celebrity's distinctive attribute is part
of that celebrity's persona, which the Lanham Act protects against
misappropriation. 247 However, adopting Second Circuit precedent,
the court held that an original musical performance cannot func-
tion as a trademark for either the performer or the song itself.2 4 8
Therefore, the court held that Henley could not maintain a Lan-
ham Act claim based solely on the Henley Defendants' use of his
songs.2 49 Regarding likelihood of confusion based on the alleged
misappropriation of a distinct attribute of Henley, the court held
that "no reasonable jury could find a likelihood that Henley actu-
ally performed" the DeVore Secondary Works and, accordingly,
awarded the Henley Defendants summary judgment on the Lan-
ham Act claim.250
The only issue unresolved on summary judgment was Henley's
claim for willful copyright infringement.2 5 1 The parties, however,
settled this issue following the court's summary judgment deci-
sion.25 2 Though DeVore could claim a partial victory in the court's
summary judgment decision, he lost the California Republican sen-
atorial primary to Carly Fiorina two days before the decision was
issued.253
246. See id. at *58-62 (detailing distinction between trademark rights for ce-
lebrities' distinctive attributes and original musical performances); see also Oliveira
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2000) (Same).
247. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *60 (explaining celebrity dis-
tinctive attributes may function as trademarks); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding "entertainer's distinctive voice" is pro-
tected by Lanham Act).
248. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *62 (holding Lanham Act
does not protections against unauthorized use of musical performances (citing
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62-63).
249. See id. at *64 (denying Lanham Act relief based on Henley Defendants'
unauthorized use of Henley's songs).
250. Id. at *64-66.
251. See id. at *57 (holding summary judgment for willful infringement was
not appropriate for either party).
252. See Order of Dismissal Upon Settlement of Case, Henley v. DeVore, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 09-0481) (dismissing case due to
settlement between parties).
253. See Associated Press, Fiorina Wins GOP Senate Primary in California, CB-
SNEWS POLITICS, (June 9, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/09/
politics/main6563065.shtml (reporting Fiorina's victory in California Republican
primary held on June 8, 2010).
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III. ANALYSIS
Part A of this Section analyzes the impact that Nader, Hagan,
Browne, and Henley will have on future cases involving the unautho-
rized use of an original musical performance in a political cam-
paign.254 Part A first discusses the impact that those cases will have
on copyright law, concluding that all four cases support the notion
that future litigations will outlast the campaigns that give rise to the
musicians' intellectual property claims.255 Part A then explains why
courts will likely prohibit musicians from bringing Lanham Act
claims against politicians who use their original musical perform-
ances without authorization. 25 6 Based on the impact discussed in
Part A, Part B of this Section proposes that courts apply a modified
alternative avenues test to make preliminary copyright fair use de-
terminations in cases involving the unauthorized use of an original
musical performance in a political campaign.257
A. Impact of Nader, Hagan, Browne and Henley on Future Cases
Involving the Unauthorized Use of an Original Musical
Performance in a Political Campaign
Like MasterCard, AFLAC, and Don Henley in their respective
litigations, Jackson Browne claimed copyright and trademark in-
fringement for the unauthorized use of his intellectual property in
a political campaign. 258 The nature of Browne's dispute, however,
was significantly different than those of the three other aforemen-
tioned plaintiffs. In Nader and Hagan, the plaintiffs' original works
254. For a further discussion of Nader's, Hagan's, Browne's, and Henley's impact
on future cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical performance
in a political campaign, see infra notes 258-97 and accompanying text.
255. For a further discussion of Nader's, Hagan's, Browne's, and Henley's impact
on copyright law, see infra notes 261-89 and accompanying text.
256. For a further discussion of why it is unlikely that musicians will be able to
bring Lanham Act claims in future disputes involving the unauthorized use of an
original musical performance in a political campaign, see infra notes 290-97 and
accompanying text.
257. For a further discussion of this Comment's proposal that courts adopt a
modified alternative avenues test to make preliminary fair use determinations in
cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a polit-
ical campaign, see infra notes 298-345 and accompanying text.
258. Compare Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(listing Browne's claims), with MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary
Comm., Inc., No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2004) (listing MasterCard's claims); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (listing AFLAC's claims); Henley, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *6 (stating Henley's intellectual property claims).
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were commercial advertisements.2 5 9 In Henley, the defendants al-
tered the plaintiffs' original musical works. 260 Despite these differ-
ences, all four cases will impact future litigations involving the
unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a political
campaign.
1. Impact of Nader, Hagan, Browne, and Henley on Copyright Law
The respective fair use analyses undertaken by the Nader and
Henley courts provide persuasive precedent for cases involving the
unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a political
campaign. The Henley and Nader decisions represent opposite ex-
tremes for analyzing fair-use parody.261 Likewise, the Nader and
Henley courts came out differently on the question of whether the
political advertisements at issue were commercial in nature under
the first fair use factor.262 Accordingly, future plaintiff-musicians
and defendant-politicians have two persuasive, yet opposite, prece-
dents to cite when resolving questions of fair use in cases involving
the unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a polit-
ical campaign.
Arguably, the Nader Advertisement and the DeVore Secondary
Works were very similar- their creators utilized the style and under-
lying substance of the well-known original works in order to criti-
cize political opponents.2 6 3 The Nader and Henley courts, however,
viewed the "reasonably be perceived" threshold for fair-use parody
very differently. 264
259. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *2-3 (describing Nader cam-
paign using MasterCard Advertisements); Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (describ-
ing Hagan campaign using AFLAC's well-known duck character).
260. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *2-5 (describing Henley De-
fendants' alterations of Don Henley's music in political advertisements).
261. Compare Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *42-43 (holding Nader
Advertisement commented on original works), with Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67987, at *29-34 (holding DeVore Secondary Works did not comment on original
works).
262. Compare Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *37 (holding Nader Adver-
tisement was noncommercial for purpose of first fair use factor), with Henley, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *35-38 (holding DeVore Secondary Works were com-
mercial for purpose of first fair use factor).
263. Compare Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *2-3 (describing Nader
Advertisement), with Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *2-5 (describing
DeVore Secondary Works).
264. Compare Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *42-43 (applying more
lenient "reasonably be perceived" standard to hold Nader Advertisement was par-
ody), with Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *29-35 (applying stricter "reason-
ably be perceived" standards to hold DeVore Secondary Works were not parody).
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The court in Nader applied a more lenient standard when eval-
uating fair-use parody. Though both the purpose and message of
the MasterCard Advertisements were nonpolitical, the court "rea-
sonably perceived" commentary in the purely political Nader Adver-
tisement.265 It seems apparent that the only purpose of the Nader
Advertisement was to convey the message that Nader was a truthful
politician. 2 6 6 It is unlikely that the Nader campaign intended for its
advertisement to function as a commentary on the MasterCard Ad-
vertisements. 267 Despite Justice Kennedy's warning that courts
should be cautious about "post hod' parody assertions when evaluat-
ing fair use, 268 the court did not inquire into the Nader campaign's
original intent.269 Rather, the court's ability to "reasonably per-
ceive[ ]" commentary on the MasterCard Advertisements was suffi-
cient to hold that the Nader Advertisement was parody.270
To the contrary, the Henley court viewed the DeVore Secondary
Works as satire-using Henley's songs to comment on third par-
ties-rather than parody.271 The court held that the DeVore Sec-
ondary Works did not directly comment on the original works, even
though Henley's songs contained political messages that contrasted
significantly with the views of DeVore. 272 The Henley court even ac-
cepted the "parody-of-the-author" theory arguendo, but in the Sum-
mer Secondary Work, the court viewed parody of Henley to be a
265. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *43 (accepting Nader cam-
paign's argument that Nader Advertisement "wittingly" commented on "materialis-
tic message" of MasterCard Advertisements).
266. See id. at *42-43 ("Ralph Nader's Political Ad attempts to show various
ways different Presidential candidates can be bought in the 'big-money arena of
Presidential politics' . . . and contrasts the 'priceless' truth represented by Ralph
Nader as the remedy for the bought and paid for positions of others.").
267. See Rumfelt, supra note 38, at 415 (opining "use of the parody category"
in Nader was "contrived" and arguing that Nader Advertisement was "more appro-
priately defined as satire").
268. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994) (Ken-
nedy, A., concurring) ("As future courts apply our fair use analysis, they must take
care to ensure that not just any commercial takeoff is rationalized post hoc as a
parody."). Because the court held that the Nader Advertisement was noncommer-
cial, political speech, it may have viewed Kennedy's advice, which addressed "com-
mercial takeoff[s]," as irrelevant. See id.; Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *37
(holding Nader Advertisement was noncommercial).
269. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *42-43 (analyzing commentary
in Nader Advertisement and not discussing Nader campaign's subjective intent).
270. See id. at *43 (holding Nader Advertisement was parody).
271. See Henley v. DeVore, No. 09-0481, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *33
(C.D. Cal. June 10, 2010) (holding DeVore Secondary Works were satire).
272. For a further discussion of the political messages contained in the origi-
nal Henley songs, see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
2011] 359
43
Cursio: Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative Avenue for Evaluating
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
360 VILLANOVA SPORTS & Er. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 18: p. 317
"relatively minor element."273 Furthermore, the Henley court di-
rectly addressed the question of whether the subjective intent of the
alleged infringer is relevant to determining fair-use parody, ulti-
mately holding that to be the standard.274 Accordingly, the Henley
court incorporated Justice Kennedy's warning about "post hoc" par-
ody assertions into the "framework" of its analysis and, overall, ap-
plied a relatively strict standard for evaluating fair-use parody.275
Incorporating an exact copy of an original work into a secon-
dary work can be transformative. 276 Accordingly, a defendant-poli-
tician in a future case involving the unauthorized use of an original
musical performance in a political campaign may be able to argue
that the use of the original work constitutes parody. Therefore, the
standards for parody applied in Nader and Henley may be relevant in
such litigations.277
Likewise, future litigants can look to Nader and Henley for per-
suasive, yet opposite, precedent addressing whether a political ad-
vertisement is commercial in nature.278 The Nader court viewed
political advertisements, even those soliciting donations, as non-
commercial, political speech. 279 Furthermore, the Nader court
opined that the Nader Advertisement's stated purpose was to "raise
public awareness of Ralph Nader's desire to be included in the up-
coming. televised Presidential candidate debates," which according
to the court, was a noncommercial purpose.280 Additionally, in its
Lanham Act analysis, the Hagan court questioned whether political
273. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *31 (evaluating parody of
Henley contained in Summer Secondary Work).
274. See id. at *26 ("The answer [to whether the parodist's subjective contem-
poraneous intent in making the work is relevant to the parody inquiry] is clearly
yes, at least as evidence of whether the work actually contains parodic character.").
275. See id. (discussing Justice Kenney's concurrence in Campbell (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994) (Kennedy, A.,
concurring))).
276. For a further discussion of the use of exact copies of original works being
transformative, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
277. For a further discussion of the Nader and Henley courts' parody analyses,
see supra note 263-75 and accompanying text.
278. Compare MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No.
00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding Na-
der Advertisement was noncommercial in nature for purpose of first fair use fac-
tor), with Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *35-38 (holding DeVore
Secondary Works were commercial for purpose of first fair use factor).
279. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 at *23-24 (holding Nader Adver-
tisement was political in nature). This analysis of the noncommercial nature of the
Nader Advertisement was conducted in the court's Lanham Act evaluation and was
incorporated into its fair use analysis. See id. at *37 (incorporating noncommercial
nature analysis in Lanham Act).
280. Id. at *37.
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advertisements even propose commercial transactions because they
discuss political issues and often challenge the qualifications of the
advertisers' political opponents.281 The Henley court, however, held
that the DeVore Secondary Works were commercial in nature be-
cause the Henley Defendants "benefitted or gained an advantage
without having to pay customary licensing fees."282 As they did
when evaluating fair-use parody, the Nader and Henley courts estab-
lished persuasive, yet opposite, precedent for future litigants in dis-
putes involving the unauthorized use of an original musical work in
a political campaign.283
Despite the differences in their substantive holdings regarding
fair use, Nader and Henley share a common attribute- a decision on
the merits for the question of fair use was not issued until after the
conclusion of the defendants' campaigns. 284 The summary judg-
ment decision in Nader was handed down on March 4, 2004, while
the Nader Advertisement was used during the 2000 presidential
campaign. 285 The summary judgment decision in Henley was
handed down on June 10, 2010, while DeVore lost his bid for the
Republican nomination for California's U.S. Senate seat two days
prior.286 Additionally, Browne did not settle until eight months after
the 2008 presidential election.287 Furthermore, the courts in Nader
and Hagan denied the plaintiffs motions for preliminary injunc-
tions during the defendants' respective campaigns. 288 Likewise, in
Browne, McCain's and the RNC's motions to dismiss were rejected
because fair use should not be adjudicated prior to discovery.289
281. See Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2D 682, 697 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (explaining noncommercial nature of Hagan Advertisement).
282. Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *38 ((citing Worldwide Church
of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
283. For a further discussion of how future litigants may be able to use Nader
and Henley to resolve questions regarding the parodic character of a secondary
work, see supra notes 263-77 and accompanying text.
284. For a further discussion of the timing of the summary judgment deci-
sions in Nader and Henley, see infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
285. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *1-3 (discussing facts of case).
286. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *1 (stating date of decision);
Associated Press, supra note 253 (reporting Carly Fiorina's victory in California
Republican primary held on June 8, 2010).
287. See Browne Settlement Order supra note 229, at 2 (ordering case dismissed
because of settlement).
288. See Nader, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *4 (stating court denied Master-
Card's motion for preliminary injunction during 2000 presidential campaign);
Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2D 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (denying
plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction).
289. For a further discussion of the Browne court's analysis of McCain's and
the RNC's motions to dismiss, see supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. But
see Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 971-72 (C.D.
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Therefore, based on the duration of Nader, Henley, Hagan and
Browne, future litigants in cases involving the unauthorized use of
an original musical performance in a political campaign can safely
conclude that the case will outlast the campaign.
2. Impact of Henley on Trademark Law
In future disputes involving the unauthorized use of an origi-
nal musical performance in a political campaign, courts will likely
prohibit musicians from asserting a Lanham Act claim against poli-
ticians who use their original musical performances without author-
ization. Adopting unambiguous Second Circuit precedent, the
Henley court held that an original musical performance cannot
function as a trademark for the performer.290 According to the
Second Circuit, an original musical performance cannot function
as a trademark for either the performer or the song itself.291 The
Second Circuit has given several justifications for this rule. First,
"[c] opyright law, not trademark law, is the primary vehicle for pro-
tecting the rights of a song's composer or her successor in interest"
in a musical work.292 To hold otherwise would grant musicians in-
definite control over a song by affording them Lanham Act protec-
tion even after the song's copyright expires.293 Second, even
2007) (dismissing complaint for copyright infringement without leave to amend
after conducting full fair use analysis); Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citi-
zens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (making fair use
determination when ruling on motion for preliminary injunction).
290. See Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *59-64 (holding Henley could
not "maintain a Lanham Act claim based purely on the use of Henley's songs"
(citing Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 60-63 (2d Cir. 2000); EMI Catalogue
P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000);
Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C. D. Cal. 2004))).
291. See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62 (holding "the law does not accord [the plain-
tiff] trademark rights in the recording of her signature performance"); EMI Cata-
logue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., No. 99-7922, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30761, at *18 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) ("We hold therefore that a
musical composition cannot be protected as its own trademark under the Lanham
Act."). This rule does not preclude the title of a song or a song itself from func-
tioning as a trademark when either is used as a source identifier for a particular
product. See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 61-62 (explaining songs can function as trade-
marks and, thus, be protected by Lanham Act if they function as marks for goods
or services); EMI Catalogue, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *15 ("The title of a
song certainly may fulfill the source- or product-identifying function of a mark.").
292. EMI Catalogue, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *16; see also Oliveira, 251
F.3d at 62 (applying reasoning used in EMI Catalogue to hold original musical per-
formance cannot function as trademark for performer).
293. See EMI Catalogue, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *18 ("A contrary con-
clusion would allow any copyright claim for infringement of rights in a musical
composition to be converted automatically into a Lanham Act cause of action.");
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62 (explaining court in EMI Catalogue "reasoned that granting
to a song the status of trademark for itselfwould stretch the definition of trademark
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though many well-known musicians have recorded performances
that are famously associated with them, "in no instance was such a
performer held to own a protected mark in that recording."294
Third, the Second Circuit distinguishes the Lanham Act's protec-
tion of celebrities' personas and distinctive attributes from original
musical performances. 295 The Henley court further explained that,
while the misappropriation of a celebrity's distinctive attribute can
create consumer confusion as to whether that celebrity is endorsing
a product, "the mere use of the celebrity's prior performance does
not present the same sort of confusion."296 Finally, invoking consti-
tutional separation of powers, the Second Circuit opined that, while
it would not be "unthinkable for the trademark law to accord to a
performing artist a trademark or service mark in her signature per-
formance," such an extension of trademark law must be made by
Congress, not the courts.297 Considering that very persuasive prece-
dent, courts will unlikely afford musicians Lanham Act rights for
their original musical performances. Accordingly, in future dis-
putes involving the unauthorized use of an original musical per-
formance in a political campaign, it is doubtful that musicians will
be able to maintain a valid Lanham Act claim.
too far and would cause disruptions as to reasonable commercial understandings"
and adopting EMI Catalogue court's reasoning to hold performer did not have
trademark rights for performance of song).
294. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62.
295. See id. at 62 ("The use of [the plaintiffs] recorded song has not taken
her persona . . . .").
296. Henley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67987, at *61. . However, in Browne, which
preceded Henley, the same court rejected the motions to dismiss Browne's Lanham
Act claim, holding that neither McCain nor the RNC established that Browne
could not demonstrate likelihood of confusion. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F.
Supp. 2d 1073, 1080-81 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting McCain's motion to dismiss
Browne's Lanham Act claim); Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (rejecting RNC's motion to dismiss Browne's Lanham Act claim). Thus,
because the McCain campaign used an original performance of Running on Empty
in the McCain Advertisement, which thereby did not raise the possibility of a mis-
appropriated distinctive attribute, the Browne court appears to have implicitly sup-
ported the notion that an original musical performance can function as a
trademark for the performer. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-77 (describing
McCain Advertisement as incorporating original performance of Running on
Empty, with which Browne is "famously associated").
297. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62-3 (reasoning it "would be profoundly disruptive
to commerce" for courts to suddenly "'recognize' the previously unknown exis-
tence" of trademark rights in original musical performances).
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B. Applying a Modified Alternative Avenues Test to Make
Preliminary Fair Use Determinations in Cases Involving
the Unauthorized Use of an Original Musical
Performance in a Political Campaign
A case involving the unauthorized use of an original musical
performance in a political campaign warrants a preliminary deter-
mination of fair use.29 8 Courts are unlikely to permit an original
musical performance to function as a trademark for the performer
or the song itself.299 Accordingly, copyright infringement will be
the only federal cause of action available to musicians when politi-
cians use their original musical performances in campaigns without
their authorization.300 Furthermore, unless the validity of a musi-
cian's copyright for a song is at issue, the only trademark infringe-
ment defense available to defendant-politicians will be fair use.30'
Musicians such as Jackson Browne and Don Henley do not
want their songs assisting the campaigns of politicians whose views
they find repugnant.302 However, the current pace of adjudicating
fair use in the context of political campaigns allows politicians to
use copyrighted material for the duration of their campaigns before
298. Cf McGeveran, supra note 113, at 122 (referencing benefit of defend-
ants' ability to raise copyright fair use defense on motions to dismiss and summary
judgment to support argument that, once record contains sufficient evidence,
question of trademark fair use should be heard earlier than question of likelihood
of confusion in Lanham Act disputes).
299. For a further discussion of courts' refusal to recognize an original musi-
cal performance as a trademark for the performer or the song itself, see supra
notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
300. See EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc.,
No. 99-7922, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *16 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) ("Copy-
right law, not trademark law, is the primary vehicle for protecting the rights of a
song's composer or her successor in interest in the musical composition."); see also
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying reasoning used
in EMI Catalogue to hold original musical performance cannot function as trade-
mark for performer).
301. Often, a musician has no legal remedy when a politician plays his or her
copyrighted music at a campaign rally because the politician has already obtained
a blanket license from the performing rights organization to which the musician
belongs. See Lauren M. Bilasz, Note, Copyrights, Campaigns, and the Collective Admin-
istration of Perfomance Rights: A Call to End Blanket Licensing of Political Events, 32
Cardozo L. Rev. 305, 308-09 (2010) (explaining rights under blanket licenses in
context of political campaigns). A politicians who obtains a blanket license for a
copyrighted song may play that song publicly "for profit in a nondramatic manner"
without the authorization of the musician who owns the song's copyright. See id. at
309 (playing music for profit with a blanket license).
302. See Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 1 1 (asserting McCain's politics "di-
rectly conflict[ ] with the political and social values that Browne has espoused and
supported throughout his career"); see also Henley Complaint, supra note 14, 1 39
(asserting Henley did not want public to believe that he "might be associated with
or endorse the social or political views of DeVore").
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courts evaluate the rights of the copyright holders.3 0 3 Accordingly,
while a campaign is still ongoing, a court should make a prelimi-
nary determination as to whether a politician's unauthorized use of
an original musical performance constitutes fair use. A court could
make such a determination by applying a modified alternative ave-
nues test to decide a musician's motion for a preliminary injunction
at the outset of a case.304
1. Legal Justification for Incorporating a Modified Alternative Avenues
Test Into the Fair Use Analysis for Cases Involving the
Unauthorized Use of an Original Musical Performance in
a Political Campaign
A modified alternative avenues test is an appropriate addition
to the fair use analysis for cases involving the unauthorized use of
an original musical performance in a political campaign. Fair use is
an "equitable rule of reason,"3 0 5 so the four statutory fair use factors
are not exclusive.306 Furthermore, fair use determinations require
a case-by-case approach, so courts may be required to consider fac-
tors outside of the four statutory factors in certain contexts.30 7
Therefore, adding an additional fair use consideration, when ap-
propriate, is in accordance with the goals of the fair use doctrine.30 8
Though applying the alternative avenues test is not necessary for
relatively straight forward questions of fair use, such as the use of a
copyright in a news report or scholarly work, it is appropriate for
cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical per-
formance in a political campaign.3 0 9
303. For a further discussion of the length of fair use determinations in cases
involving the use of intellectual property in political campaigns relative to the
length of the political campaigns that gave rise to the claims, see supra notes 284-
89.
304. Cf Patry and Posner, supra note 41, at 1650 (proposing fair use rule for
specific situation in which party wishes to copy "old [copyrighted] works of limited
value").
305. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.4
(9th Cir. 1986) (reviewing legislative history of codified fair use defense).
306. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61
(1985) (explaining four statutory fair use factors are "are not meant to be exclu-
sive" but are "especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair").
307. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("The task [of determining fair use] is not to
be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis.").
308. For a further discussion of the flexible nature of the fair use doctrine,
see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
309. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2010) (listing news reporting and
scholarship as examples of fair use).
2011] 365
49
Cursio: Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative Avenue for Evaluating
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
366 VILLANOVA SPORTS & Er. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 18: p. 317
The alternative avenues test is an appropriate means for bal-
ancing copyright and First Amendment interests. The intuitive
conflict between the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause
manifests itself clearly when politicians use original musical per-
formances in their political campaigns without authorization.3 10
Campaigning for elected office is one of the most "fundamental
First Amendment activities."3 1 1 Likewise, preventing the federal
government from unjustly infringing on private property rights is
one of the most fundamental goals of the U.S. Constitution.312
Though not tangible, a copyrighted means of expression is a form
of property that the Constitution empowers Congress to protect.3 13
Copyright ownership, however, limits the ability of politicians to
freely use the words, phrases and creativity that form the building
blocks of a copyrighted means of expression.314 Despite these con-
flicting interests, "copyright's limited monopolies" are meant to be
"compatible with free speech principles."3 15 By weighing a musi-
cian's property rights in his or her creative expression against a pol-
itician's need to use that form of expression to communicate with
voters, adding the alternative avenues test to a fair use analysis
would enable such compatibility.3 16 Furthermore, the alternative
avenues test is derived from a real property dispute, so it is not ex-
clusive to trademark law in the context of intellectual property.317
Therefore, the alternative avenues test is a proper means for bal-
ancing copyright ownership and First Amendment rights.
310. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2001) (explaining Copyright Clause and First Amendment are "intuitively in
conflict").
311. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining politi-
cal "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fun-
damental First Amendment activities").
312. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of private property
"without due process of law" and takings of private property for public use "with-
out just compensation").
313. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining copyright
ownership is form of property ownership); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("[The
Congress shall have power] [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
314. For a further discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy, see supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
315. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (discussing original intent
behind Copyright Clause).
316. For a further discussion of the fundamental principles of the alternative
avenues test, see supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
317. For a further discussion of the origin of the alternative avenues test, see
supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
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For it to be a proper means of evaluating fair use when an orig-
inal musical performance is used in a political campaign without
permission, the alternative avenues test must be modified to accord
less deference to intellectual property rights.3 18 The alternative av-
enues test must not resemble a bright line rule when used to make
preliminary determinations of fair use; courts must not automati-
cally defer to copyright holders if there are any alternative means of
expression available.3 19 Rather, courts must decide on a case-by-
case basis whether an alternative means of communication is "suffi-
cient."320 Because determinations of fair use require a "sensitive"
balancing of copyright and free speech interests,321 the fact-sensi-
tive inquiry to determine "sufficient alternative means" must take
into account the heightened level of protection that the First
Amendment affords political activities. 322 Furthermore, the scope
of the fair use defense is "wider when the use relates to issues of
public concern."323 Accordingly, a court must carefully consider
whether enjoining the use of a song will significantly reduce a can-
didate's ability to reach the electorate when applying the alternative
avenues test to make a preliminary fair use determination. 324 A pol-
itician may feel that a particular song is the most effective way to
convey his or her particular message to the electorate in that partic-
ular election, even though there are other adequate ways to convey
the politician's message. Additionally, courts should not place a sig-
nificant burden of creating original expressive works on politicians
when the politicians are trying to reach the electorate. Thus, the
318. For a further discussion of the alternative avenues test's deference to the
property rights of trademark holders in Lanham Act disputes, see supra notes 189-
92 and accompanying text.
319. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating bright line rules are inappropriate
for fair use determinations).
320. See id. (explaining fair use requires case-by-case analysis).
321. For a further discussion of the interests balanced in fair use determina-
tions, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
322. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam) (" [I]t can hardly
be doubted that the [First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."). For a further discus-
sion of the heightened First Amendment protections of political speech, see supra
notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
323. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th
Cir. 1994) (explaining fair use protected defendant's right to use document at
issue "to comment on public issues and to petition the government regarding legis-
lation" (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1050 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984))).
324. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002)
("The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative
that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public
importance.").
3672011]
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alternative avenues test must be modified to be less deferential to
copyright holders when it is incorporated into the fair use analysis
for cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical per-
formance in a political campaign.
As modified, the alternative avenues test is a proper addition to
the fair use analysis for cases involving the unauthorized use of an
original musical performance in a political campaign. First, the fair
use doctrine's purpose is to balance intellectual property and First
Amendment interests, so the alternative avenues test's function of
balancing property and First Amendment rights is a natural fit for a
fair use evaluation.325 Second, a flexible and adoptable method of
evaluation is required for fair use determinations.3 2 6 The modified
alternative avenues test described above affords courts the neces-
sary flexibility to determine what constitutes a "sufficient alternative
means," while still according the property rights of musicians
proper deference by requiring politicians to demonstrate that there
are no "sufficient alternative means" of communication available.
Finally, though the alternative avenues test is applied as an inde-
pendent First Amendment defense in Lanham Act claims,327 the
modified alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment would
only function as an additional consideration in the fair use analysis
for cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical per-
formance in a political campaign. Such an application of the alter-
native avenues test is consistent with the majority view that a
separate First Amendment analysis is not necessary in copyright in-
fringement suits.32 8
Furthermore, the concerns of courts that have rejected the al-
terative avenues test for Lanham Act disputes would not be applica-
ble if the modified alternative avenues test proposed in this
325. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20 (opining fair use defense protects First
Amendment rights by allowing "the public to use not only facts and ideas con-
tained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.").
For a further discussion of the interests balanced in a fair use analysis, see supna
notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
326. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("The
fair use doctrine thus permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that
law is designed to foster." (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)
(internal quotations omitted)).
327. For a further discussion of the alternative avenues test's function as an
independent First Amendment defense in Lanham Act claims, see supra notes 189-
203 and accompanying text.
328. For a further discussion of the reasons why courts do not engage in a
separate First Amendment analysis when adjudicating Copyright claims, see supra
notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: p. 317
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Comment is applied to the fair use analysis for cases involving the
unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a political
campaign.329 First, many of those courts express concerns that the
alternative avenues test does not adequately protect the right to
free expression.330 Applying a modified alternative avenues test to
the fair use analysis for a case involving the unauthorized use of an
original musical performance in a political campaign would require
a court to take into account the strong First Amendment protec-
tions of political speech when deciding if there are "sufficient alter-
native means" of communication available.33' Second, the Parks
court was very concerned that the alternative avenues test would
require a judicial evaluation of creative necessity, which the court
believed to be an inappropriate task for the judiciary.332 The use of
an original musical performance in a political campaign does not
raise that concern because there is little artistic creativity involved
in choosing a popular song to play in a campaign commercial or at
a rally. Political advisors may put much thought into choosing
songs that effectively convey a candidate's message, but such strate-
gic decision making is very different than choosing a title for an
artistic work to convey the artist's message.333
Finally, many courts feel that trademark and real property
rights should not be equated or analogized for the purpose of bal-
ancing property rights with First Amendment rights and, thus, the
alternative avenues test should not be applied to intellectual prop-
erty disputes.33 4 In the context of evaluating the necessity of incor-
329. For a further discussion of the reasons why courts have rejected or signif-
icantly limited the use of the alternative avenues test to balance trademark and
First Amendment rights, see supra note 198-203 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971
(10th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n the context of intellectual property, Lloyd's 'no adequate
alternative avenues' test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in
free expression."); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We can-
not indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." (quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971))).
331. For a further discussion of how the modified alternative avenues test pro-
posed in this Comment will take into account the heightened First Amendment
protections of political speech, see supra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
332. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
alternative avenues test because, inter alia, test would require courts to evaluate
whether unauthorized use of trademark is "necessary" to communicate idea).
333. See id. (explaining importance of choosing proper words when titling
expressing works). For a further discussion of the purposes of using music in polit-
ical campaigns, see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., id. (noting "awkwardness of analogizing property rights in land
to property rights in words or ideas"); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The first amendment issues involved in this [Lanham
2011] 369
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porating a trademark into a creative work's title, that is a valid
concern. 335 However, the unauthorized use of an original musical
performance in a political campaign is very analogous to the dis-
pute in Lloyd that gave rise to the alternative avenues doctrine.3 3 6
In Lloyd, the Court opined that allowing the war protesters to utilize
the defendant's shopping mall rather than the adjacent public
streets and sidewalks would "diminish property rights without signif-
icantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech."3 3 7 Further-
more, courts that apply the alternative avenues test to Lanham Act
disputes reason that precluding a speaker from using one means of
expression neither deprives the speaker of the right to free expres-
sion nor prevents the public from benefitting from the speaker's
ideas.33 8 Had the Browne court prohibited the defendants from us-
ing Running on Empty to critique Obama in the McCain Advertise-
ment, there would have been many other ways to supplement the
clip of Obama speaking so that the McCain campaign's intended
message was communicated to voters.339 Accordingly, there will be
no "awkwardness" if courts apply the modified alternative avenues
test proposed in this Comment to the fair use analysis for cases in-
volving the unauthorized use of an original musical performance in
a political campaign.3 40 Therefore, the modified alternative ave-
nues test proposed in this Comment is an appropriate addition to
the fair use analysis for such cases.
Act] case cannot be disposed of by equating the rights of a trademark owner with
the rights of an owner of real property.").
335. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 ("To suggest that other words can be used as
well to express an author's or composer's message is not a proper test for weighing
First Amendment rights.").
336. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556 (1972) (describing dispute).
337. Id. at 566-67 (reasoning sufficient alternative means were available for
war protesters to distribute handbills).
338. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
(justifying injunction prohibiting use of plaintiff's trademark because "it deprives
neither [the defendant] nor the public of the benefits of his ideas"); see also Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979) (explaining district court did not infringe on defendants' First Amendment
rights by enjoining use of plaintiffs trademark because "numerous" other means
of communication were available).
339. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1076-77 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(describing McCain Advertisement as playing Running on Empty in background
while it showed clip of Obama recommending people conserve energy by keeping
their tires fully inflated and displayed McCain campaign's slogans).
340. Contra Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 (noting "awkwardness of analogizing prop-
erty rights in land to property rights in words or ideas").
[Vol. 18: p. 317
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2. Practical Application of Using a Modified Alternative Avenues Test
to Make Preliminary Fair Use Determinations in Cases
Involving the Unauthorized Use of an Original Musical
Performance in a Political Campaign
The modified alternative avenues test proposed above will al-
low courts to make much needed preliminary fair use determina-
tions in cases involving the unauthorized use of original musical
performances in political campaigns. The alternative avenues test
prohibits one from using another's intellectual property to engage
in protected speech when there are "sufficient alternative means"
of communication available.3 '" Additionally, fair use is an affirma-
tive defense, which places the burden of proof on the defendant. 342
Accordingly, a defendant-politician will be required to demonstrate
a lack of "sufficient alternative means" of communication if the
modified alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment is ap-
plied to the fair use analysis for a case involving the unauthorized
use of an original musical performance in a political campaign.
A court will be able to evaluate a defendant-politician's argu-
ments concerning the modified alternative avenues test on a plain-
tiff-musician's motion for a preliminary injunction .3 43  If the
defendant-politician fails to persuade the court that there are no
"sufficient alternative means" of communication available to ex-
press his or her campaign's message, the court would be justified in
issuing a preliminary injunction and then allowing the defendant-
politician to argue the more fact-intensive aspects of fair use-such
as transformative use-at summary judgment or trial.34 4 Because
the primary purpose of using an original musical performance in a
political campaign is to express a political message, the necessity of
that song's use will likely be more relevant to a fair use determina-
tion than questions about transformative use or the impact that the
politician's unauthorized use will have on the market for that
341. See id. at 448 (explaining standard for alternative avenues test in Lanham
Act disputes).
342. See Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery v. Gregory, 685 F. Supp.
2d 217, 226 (D. Mass. 2010) (explaining fair use is affirmative defense).
343. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 502(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (authorizing temporary in-
junctions to "prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright"); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (up-
holding district court's preliminary injunction because there were "numerous
ways" in which defendants could have conveyed message without misappropriating
plaintiffs trademark); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach's Coal. For
Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 476-77 (N.D. 111. 1994) (evaluating alternative avenues test
and issuing preliminary injunction in Lanham Act dispute).
344. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (holding factual record was insuffi-
cient to evaluate four statutory fair use factors prior to discovery).
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song.34 5 Therefore, incorporating the modified alternative avenues
test proposed in this Comment into the fair use analysis for cases
involving the unauthorized use of an original musical performance
in a political campaign will allow musicians to assert their intellec-
tual property rights while a political campaign is still ongoing and
also allow politicians to argue all aspects of fair use.
IV. CONCLUSION
Music is a significant part of modern political campaigns, so it
is likely that disputes between musicians and politicians will con-
tinue to arise, especially during high-profile elections.346 The re-
cent Browne and Henley cases demonstrate an increased willingness
on the part of both musicians and politicians to litigate disputes
over the unauthorized use of music in political campaigns.347 Fur-
thermore, Browne and Nader were not resolved until almost nine
months and four years, respectively, after the defendants' cam-
paigns concluded.348 These facts are other strong indicators that
politicians are willing to seriously defend claims regarding their use
of intellectual property during their campaigns. Because contem-
porary politicians generally play original musical performances on
the campaign trail, it is likely that more disputes like Browne will
reach the courts in the near future. 349
Therefore, it is in the interest of justice to use the modified
alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment to make prelimi-
nary fair use determinations in cases involving the unauthorized
use of an original musical performance in a political campaign.
The modified alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment is
an appropriate addition to the fair use analysis for cases involving
345. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (listing statutory fair use factors). For a further
discussion of the purpose of using music in political campaigns, see supra notes 2-6
and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., Browne Complaint, supra note 13, 11 1-2 (occurring during 2008
presidential election); Henley Complaint, supra note 14, 1 1 (occurring during 2010
Republican primary for nomination for U.S. Senate seat in California held by
member of current majority party).
347. For a further discussion of Browne and Henley, see supra notes 210-53 and
accompanying text.
348. See Browne Settlement Order, supra note 229, at 2 (issuing final settlement
order in August 2009); MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00-6068, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3644, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (decided on March 8, 2004) (same).
349. See NPR Interview, supra note 2 (explaining most contemporary politi-
cians play "already existing music" on campaign trail); Browne v. McCain, 611 F.
Supp. 2d 1073, 1076-77 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (describing McCain campaign's use of
Browne's original musical performance). For a further discussion of examples of
the use of original musical performances by contemporary politicians, see supra
notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
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the unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a polit-
ical campaign.35 0 Applying it to the fair use determination in such
a case will allow a musician to protect his or her copyright interests
in a timely manner, while also allowing a politician to assert a com-
prehensive fair use defense.3 5 1 Accordingly, courts should apply
the modified alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment to
make preliminary fair use determinations in cases involving the un-
authorized use of an original musical performance in a political
campaign.
Matthew j Cursio*
350. For a further discussion of the legal justifications for applying the modi-
fied alternative avenues test proposed in this Comment to the fair use analysis for
cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical performance in a polit-
ical campaign, see supra notes 305-40 and accompanying text.
351. For a further discussion of how incorporating the modified alternative
avenues test proposed in this Comment will allow for preliminary determinations
of fair use in cases involving the unauthorized use of an original musical perform-
ance in a political campaign, see supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
* J.D. candidate 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2001, Villa-
nova University.
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